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GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE NEW
POVERTY AGENDA
WENDY A. BACH*
Across the country a new poverty agenda is emerging. These efforts
are limited by the political consensus that has emerged since welfare
reform, and the focus, as has always been the case, on the "deserving"-in
today's iteration, primarily the working poor. Mirroring national and
international trends, the means of governance of these new social welfare
programs has also begun to change. Where once there was a set of
programs ostensibly controlled through law and regulations, in growing
pockets there is now radical devolution and abandonment of traditional legal
and rule making structures. Experiments in policy, program structure, and
governance frameworks proliferate. These new governing structures are
closely aligned with new governance theory, which in turn holds out the
promise that-through a process of deep democratic participation and
continual experimentation and redesign-the governing enterprise will
produce a set of policies that are more responsive to the real needs of those
in poverty.
This Article argues, however, that prevalent governing mechanisms
of the new poverty agenda diminish rather than enhance accountability and
responsiveness. Program structures undermine the ability of recipients to
ensure that these benefits are being fairly administered. Moreover, contrary
to the best of new governance theory, the absence of substantive
participation by poor communities in goal-setting and program design
fundamentally undermines the experimentalist enterprise. The new poverty
policy "experiments" reveal an unwillingness to test the subordination-
tinged political assumptions of "deservingness" and "undeservingness" that
lie at the heart of the new poverty policy, thereby limiting the ability of the
experimentalist enterprise to create more responsive poverty policy. Despite
these striking failures, however, new poverty programs could realize the
deep democracy promise of new governance. If governing systems include
effective structures to ensure accountability both to those who seek to
benefit and to the communities that seek to participate in designing and
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evaluating programs, new governance frameworks can be strategically
deployed to facilitate the creation of a more responsive new poverty agenda.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been fourteen years since U.S. welfare reform. If we ever
had a safety net, it is gone. At the same time, across the country there
is a growing set of efforts to understand and address poverty. These
efforts are limited by the political consensus about poverty that has
emerged since welfare reform, and focus, as has always been the case,
on the "deserving"-today, primarily the working poor. Accompanying
the shifts in policy are radical shifts in governance. Mirroring national
and international trends, the means of governance of social-welfare
programs-in significant and growing program areas-has begun to
change. Where once there was a set of programs created and ostensibly
controlled through law and regulations, in growing pockets there is now
radical devolution and abandonment of traditional legal and rulemaking
240
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structures. Experiments in policy, program structure, and governance
frameworks proliferate. These new governing structures are, to greater
and lesser extents, aligned with new governance theory, often described
as a collaborative, "softer" model of administrative governance where a
variety of stakeholders work together to create, implement, and
continually renegotiate programmatic goals, structure, and
implementation.
The shifts in the substance and governance structure of the new
social-welfare programs epitomizes a central question at the heart of
new governance theory: is new governance more aligned with the
fundamentally conservative drive towards "[d]eregulation,
privatization, [and] reduction of social services,"' or is it-as Fung and
Wright among others suggest-radically left, the source of
"transformative democratic strategies that can advance . . . egalitarian
social justice, individual liberty combined with popular control over
collective decisions, community and solidarity, and the flourishing of
individuals in ways which enable them to realize their potentials"?2 Do
new governance structures render the government more deeply
accountable to individuals and communities-and therefore provide a
structural mechanism to achieve a more responsive set of policies and
programs-or is the converse true?'
A careful examination of trends in U.S. social-welfare policy
suggests a complicated answer to these questions. The case study herein
suggests that the new poverty agenda threatens unaccountability, both to
the individuals who might seek to benefit from new social-welfare
programs and to the poor communities that might seek to participate in
the design and evaluation of those programs. The result is a new
poverty agenda that is, to a significant extent, insulated from critique
by poor communities. But accountability and mechanisms toward
improvement of these programs are not necessarily out of reach. If the
governing mechanisms of the new poverty agenda are explicitly
structured to render them accountable to both individuals and
communities, they can deploy the transformative possibilities within
new governance and provide an important structural means to bring
1. Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered
Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 4 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds.,
2003).
2. Id.
3. This question was raised, in various forms and by various participants,
throughout the conference. See, e.g., David & Louise Trubek, Questions As We Go
Forward: A Final Discussion (Nov. 21, 2009) (slides on file with author).
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about progressive change.4 This Article seeks to describe the
substantive, governance, and accountability trends epitomized by shifts
in U.S. social-welfare policy and suggest a roadmap towards this
transformative possibility.
The Article relies upon a case study of New York City's Center
for Economic Opportunity (CEO), perhaps the most fully realized
manifestation of emerging trends in U.S. poverty policy. Through a
close examination of New York City's experimentation with conditional
cash transfer programs and its efforts to more accurately measure
poverty, this Article argues that if the CEO model continues to gain
prominence and is replicated, the programs that characterize the new
poverty agenda will fail to be accountable in at least two crucial
respects. First, they will diminish rather than enhance the ability of
individuals who are the targeted beneficiaries of the program to ensure
that the benefits are being administered fairly and consistently. Second,
in direct opposition to the best of new governance theory, the governing
structures will fail to deepen or broaden the means by which affected
communities participate in the design, implementation, and evaluation
of the programs that affect their lives. Despite these striking failures,
however, neither the new poverty agenda nor its governing structures
must be characterized by this lack of accountability. If careful attention
is paid to inclusion of structures to ensure accountability, poverty
programs characterized by new governance have the potential to
significantly enhance domestic poverty policy.
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I describes the shifts in
poverty policy in the post welfare-reform era, tracing the trajectory of
the kinds of programs being offered and the shifting target of those who
the programs posit as worthy of support. Part II describes emerging
4. This Article seeks to use new governance mechanisms as a tool for the
creation of a more progressive poverty policy. In this sense it is aligned with an
instrumentalist lawyering view of those governance mechanisms. As Douglas NeJaime
frames this view,
[W]hile New Governance positions itself mainly as a project of the Left,
there is little inherently progressive about it, and many of its strategies and
principles seem decidedly centrist. Indeed, New Governance is in some
ways a coming-to-terms with the conservative turn of the state in the last,
several decades. In fact, New Governance resonates with neo-liberalism;
the impulse toward less centralized regulation and an appeal to privatization
reflects neo-liberal ideals which have enjoyed currency in the American
post-welfare state. Those coming from politically conservative perspectives
might have little reason to resist New Governance process on purely
political grounds, thus giving advocates a way to devise governance systems
that seek to bring about progressive change through centrist means.....
Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 343-44 (2009).
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trends in governance structure that characterize the new poverty agenda
and argues that these structures align in significant respects with new
governance theory. Part II also argues that the CEO is increasingly
viewed as a trendsetter in poverty policy and therefore merits careful
consideration. To more precisely frame the question of accountability
and responsiveness at the heart of this Article, Part III defines two
related measures of accountability: first, the ability of individuals to
ensure that they receive benefits in a fair and consistent manner; and
second, the ability of affected communities to impact the programmatic
decisions that affect their lives. Part III then outlines the structures
designed to reach those aspects of accountability in old and new
governance, and reviews some of the critiques of the ability of new
governance to promote accountability along each measure. Part IV
turns to the New York City case study for a more detailed look at
accountability along both measures in emerging new poverty agenda
programs. Finally, Part V argues that new governance structures-if
designed to ensure accountability along these two measures-have the
potential to facilitate the creation of a more progressive and responsive
policy agenda.
I. DOMESTIC POVERTY POLICY: FROM ENTITLEMENT TO LIMITED AND
CONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE WORKING POOR
American poverty policy has significantly changed during the last
thirteen years. Most famous among these shifts is the abandonment of a
national commitment to provide support for indigent families and an
abandonment of uniformity in the means of administering social-welfare
programs. With the signing of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, Bill Clinton famously ended
"welfare as we [knew] it," 5 and with it, the federal government's
commitment to provide centrally regulated, baseline assistance to
families in need. In place of Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(AFDC)-the assistance program that arose out of the New Deal and
created an entitlement to benefits-the federal government created
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a program that
limited receipt of assistance to five years over the course of a
recipient's adult life,6 targeted immigrant communities,7 devolved
significant authority for program design and administration to states and
5. Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill Amid Division, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006).
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localities,' and invited states to include private entities in the
administration of welfare programs.' The devolution of authority from
national to state and local government and the invitation to engage
private entities would alter significantly both the substance and the
governing structures of the new poverty agenda.
In large part as a result of welfare reform, welfare caseloads have
dropped dramatically. Whereas in 1995 there were 13.6 million
individual AFDC beneficiaries,'" by 2009 that number dropped to just
over 4 million"-an unprecedented 7 0-percent drop in the national
caseload.12 With the exception of a limited number of states where state
programs provide some level of cash assistance when families hit the
federal time limit, across the nation today, poor individuals receive no
cash assistance to help them meet their basic needs.
To the extent that welfare programs still exist, they are focused,
far more than their predecessors, on forcing recipients to comply with
onerous work requirements as a condition of receiving assistance.
Federal legislation mandates that states meet work participation
requirements and significantly limits states' ability to provide assistance
to individuals who do not comply with work requirements.1
The results of welfare reform are hotly contested from a variety of
perspectives. Some view the dramatic drop in caseload itself as a
tremendous success.1 According to these analysts, AFDC was largely a
8. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (2006). See also generally Wendy A. Bach,
Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power Reconfiguring Adminstrative Law
Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 275, 279 (2009).
10. Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1995 AFDC Total Caseload, http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/ofaldata-reports/caseloadlafdc/1995/fycytotal_95_ek.htm.
11. Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, TANF: Total Number of Recipients, Fiscal Year 2009 (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/2009/2009_recipienttan.
htm. Note that these figures pertain to receipt of Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families, the program that followed AFDC.
12. Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, TANF Caseload Data, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofaldata-reports/
caseload/caseloadrecent.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2006).
14. See Welfare and Work Data: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 25 (2005) (statement of
Dr. Wade F. Horn, Asst. Sec'y for Children & Families, U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Servs.) (celebrating a 55-percent decrease in welfare caseloads). See also
Christine Kim & Robert Rector, Welfare Reform Turns Ten: Evidence Shows Reduced
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failed program that created negative incentives by keeping people out of
the workforce and mired in poverty. AFDC was said to create a
"culture of dependency" and thus the decline in assistance alone is
viewed as a success.
The effect of welfare reform on those in poverty-apart from the
decline in the use of assistance programs-is more complicated. During
the late 1990s, poverty rates dropped, and it appeared that welfare
reform contributed at least in part to that trend. Later, as the economic
bubble of the late 1990s began to burst, the picture became more dire.
Families were, overwhelmingly, trapped within an unstable low-wage
labor market that failed to provide the minimum subsistence they
needed. Over time, families did not appear to be moving up the
economic ladder in any significant number." Women were faring
particularly badly.16 In addition, the minimal data that exists evaluating
welfare outcomes on the basis of race suggests that programs are
administered in a way that results in better outcomes for whites than for
people of color." For example, in Wisconsin from 1995 through 1996,
"61 percent of the white families receiving assistance left the caseload,
compared to 36 percent of the African-American families." 8 In Illinois,
data analyzing why recipients left the roles from June 1997 to June
1999 revealed racial disparities in the reasons for case closure.19 In that
period,
15. See Heather Boushey & David Rosnick, Jobs Held by Former Welfare
Recipients Hit Hard by Economic Downturn 2 (2003), available at http://www.cepr.
net/documents/publications/welfarereform 2003 09.pdf ("Unemployment has risen
from 3.9 percent to 6.2 percent between October 2000 and July 2003 and many of the
industries in which former welfare recipients found jobs were hit harder than the
average industry.").
16. Elizabeth Lower-Basch, TANF Policy Brief Cash Assistance Since
Welfare Reform 1 (2009), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/
files/CashAssistance.pdf ("As the welfare caseloads fell, the number of low-income
single mothers who were working and not receiving welfare increased, but so did the
number of low-income single mothers who were neither working nor receiving welfare.
In 2007, the Congressional Research Service calculates that one third of single
mothers-heading more than 1.2 million families-were neither working nor receiving
cash assistance. Many of these woman have disabilities that limit their ability to work,
but either do not meet the stringent definition of disability needed for SSI benefits, or
are waiting for their SSI applications to be approved.").
17. Second in Series on Welfare Reform: Work Requirements on the TANF
Cash Welfare Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 10 (2001) (statement of Steve Savner, Senior
Staff Attorney, Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy).
18. Id. at 64.
19. Id at 65.
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[a] total of 340,958 cases closed . . . of which 102,423 were
whites and 238,535 were minorities. Fifty-four percent of
minority cases, but only 39 percent of white cases, closed
because the recipient failed to comply with program rules.
Though earned income made 40 percent of white families
ineligible for support, earned income made only 27 percent of
minority families ineligible.20
In addition, various studies indicate better treatment of white
recipients than African American recipients in regard to positive
encouragement and assistance in job search and provision of supportive
assistance. 21
In addition to the data above, there is substantial anecdotal
evidence arising from recent litigation that public-benefit programs still
fail to conform to statutory and regulatory mandates. Across the
country, lawyers continue to litigate on behalf of classes of individuals
who have been denied benefits in violation of law or have been treated
illegally in a variety of other ways.22
The more disturbing results of welfare reform-the increasing
vulnerability of poor people to an unstable low-wage labor market, the
lack of a safety net in times of economic crisis, the disparate negative
outcomes for people of color, and the continuing prevalence of
maladministration of assistance programs-can be contextualized within
a long history of using social-welfare policy as a tool to perpetuate
gender, class, and race subordination. 23 There is no question that racial
stereotypes "about lack of work effort (along with the widespread
stereotype that all or most welfare recipients are black . . . .)" have
been subtexts to arguments on behalf of key features of contemporary
welfare reform.24 Such features include mandatory work requirements
for welfare recipients, along with punitive sanctions and eligibility time
limits, all of which are said to be necessary to prod supposedly indolent
poor mothers to end their purported preference welfare dependency and
20. Id.
21. Id. at 65-66.
22. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE
RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR (2001); JILL QUADAGNO,
THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994);
LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND (Randy Albelda & Ann
Withorn eds., 2002); WHOSE WELFARE? (Gwendolyn Mink ed., 1998).
24. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 23, at 115.
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become "responsible."" It is also clear that welfare reform, with its
emphasis on marriage promotion and its active derogation of single
parenthood was meant both to restore the patriarchal family26 and to
render the poor more economically vulnerable, thereby lessening their
bargaining power in the low-wage workforce .2 Although U.S. social-
welfare policy has-in response to activism28-provided significant
support for poor individuals, it also has been characterized by programs
that prevent political unrest and create a workforce that is desperate
enough to engage in low-wage work.29 It often has been fairly
characterized as a means to keep that workforce desperate and willing
to do the worst work in the economy. It is into that breach that the new
poverty agenda steps.
A. The New Poverty Agenda
Both the content and the rhetoric of poverty policy has shifted, in
some respects, since 1996. At least until the economic crisis of 2008,30
25. The emphasis on "responsibility" was clear from the name of the act: The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.
26. For clear evidence of the focus, within welfare reform, on marriage
promotion, the evils of single parenthood and its explicit promotion of two-parent
families, see generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101(1), (8), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-11 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 601) (finding that "[m]arriage is the foundation of a successful society"
and that "[t]he negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth are well
documented"). For extensive discussions of the role of racist and patriarchal
assumptions about welfare recipients, see generally sources cited supra note 23.
27. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING
THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971).
28. A review of the extensive victories of advocates and communities in
fighting on behalf of those in poverty is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
interesting history of the legal and organizing movements, see MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1st ed.
1993); see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK: FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND
WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2000).
29. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. In the months following the economic crisis, there emerged (in addition to
the programs and policy proposals discussed herein) some movement toward a
conception of baseline assistance-an acknowledgment that the new focus on programs
designed to support workers is insufficient in a world where the economy fails to
provide even low-wage unstable work. For example, in 2009, President Obama signed
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which created the TANF Emergency
Contingency Fund. Funded at $5 billion, the Emergency Contingency Fund targeted
basic assistance, non-recurrent short-term benefits and subsidized employment.
Elizabeth Lower-Basch, Questions and Answers about the TANF Emergency Fund 2
(2009), available at http://www.seta.org/uploadedFiles/springlOconference/tanf-efc
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there was-among national and state policy-makers-a nearly universal
acceptance of welfare reform's eradication of a safety net. However,
the rhetoric on poverty policy began to shift in some circles after the
economic decline of the late 1990s, in part because some saw the
results of welfare reform as far more complicated. There has been a
growing, vocal, and ultimately national level acknowledgment that,
despite any success that might be attributed to welfare reform, many
people remained trapped in poverty. Statistics such as the high
percentage of full-time head-of-household workers living well below
the federal poverty line," high numbers of full-time workers without
health insurance,32 and the increased visibility of deep poverty that
arose from Hurricane Katrina drive these trends. In response, policy-
makers and advocates began to emphasize programs to address the
needs of the working poor.33 Programs began to be refrained as support
for the working poor. We began to hear that food stamps were not
"welfare" but were "work supports"; they were not unjustified
handouts to the undeserving poor, but support designed for those who
are productive, working members of society.34 Similarly, child-care
payments and the payment of Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) are
characterized not as handouts but instead as "demand side"
intervention-supplements designed to make up for the "market failure"
qanda0409.pdf. See also Peter Edelman & Barbara Ehrenreich, Why Welfare Reform
Fails its Recession Test, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2009, at Bl.
31. A 2001 study conducted by the Urban Institute estimated that 41 percent
of former welfare recipients lived below the federal poverty level even after considering
earned income tax credit, food stamps, and other resources. In 2002, the General
Accounting Office estimated that former welfare recipients earned between
approximately $9,500 to $15,000 annually, leaving them below the federal poverty
level. CYNTHIA M. FAGNONI, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM:
STATES PROVIDE TANF-FUNDED WORK SUPPORT SERVICES TO MANY Low-INCOME
FAMILIES WHO Do NOT RECEIVE CASH ASSISTANCE 5, GAO-02-615T (2002).
32. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2007 and 2008, about 21 million
full-time workers in the U.S. did not have health insurance. In the same period,
uninsured part-time workers increased from 5.7 million to 6.8 million. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2008, tbl.7 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-
236.pdf.
33. See infra notes 36-44 and 63-67 and accompanying text.
34. The food stamp program was in fact recently renamed the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), a clear effort to disentangle it from stigmatized
welfare benefits of the past. THE URBAN INST., LIWF FACT SHEET: MANY Low-INCOME
WORKING FAMILIES TURN TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR
HELP 4 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411938 snapfor
help.pdf. Left out of these programs are, of course, those who are deemed undeserving
because of their refusal to work.
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that is low-wage work and tools to incentivize the choice to engage in
work over welfare.
As a result, we began to see movement at every level of
government to design programs that would-to some degree, and within
significant political constraints-attempt to address this problem. This
trend represents, in some senses, a different kind of break from the
New Deal. The New Deal government-benefit programs represented a
commitment to providing minimal subsistence; its welfare programs did
not purport to help families move out of poverty. At the start of the
twenty-first century, a significant number of local and state officials,
and many policy-makers and advocates, began to talk about poverty and
to design programs that purport to address it.35
On every level of government, the initiatives directed at poverty
reduction fall very roughly into two conceptual categories. First,
advocates and policy-makers have emphasized expansion of preexisting
programs-food stamps, health insurance, child-care assistance, and
housing subsidies-targeted at low-income workers. Second, there has
been a focus on a different set of interventions that emphasize setting
targets and the use of experimental programs to address the needs of the
poor. A brief overview of some of these initiatives gives some contour
to these trends.
Efforts to expand traditional interventions targeted at the working
poor have taken place at every level of government. On both the
national and state level,36 initiatives focus on the expansion of the EITC
and on other programs designed to assist low-income working families.
On the national level, the EITC program has been recognized as one of
the most successful federal programs to assist working families out of
poverty. Federal funding for EITC steadily increased from $30.4
billion in 1997 to $49.1 billion in 2008.38 Also, under the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a new category for
35. See infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
36. In recent years there has been an increase in EITC state participation. In
2006, nineteen states participated in the state EITC program. See AMI NAGLE &
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A HAND UP: How STATE
EARNED INCOME TAx CREDITS HELP WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN 2006, at
21 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-8-06sfp.pdf. Currently there are
twenty-three states participating in the program. See also State EITC Online Resource
Center, 50 State Map, http://www.stateeitc.com/map/index.asp (last visited Mar. 23,
2010).
37. Marybeth J. Mattingly, Forty-Three Percent of Eligible Rural Families
Can Claim A Larger Tax Credit With EITC Expansion 1 (2009), available at
http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/PB-EITC-09.pdf.




EITC-eligible participants was created to further expand the program in
response to the recession." Similarly, the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP)-formerly known as Food Stamps-also
experienced a steady increase in federal funding from $21.5 billion in
1997 to $53.6 billion in 2009.' SNAP participation rates increased by
96 percent from 2000 to 2009.41 SNAP caseloads reached over 33
million individuals in 2009.42 Federal statutes including the 2002 Farm
Bill and 2009 ARRA provided increased eligibility and removed
barriers to participation mainly for the working poor.4 3 Federal
spending on child-care also saw an increase from $2.3 billion in 1996
to $4.8 billion in 2001."
Additionally, advocates and lawmakers have begun to promote
new initiatives. Most prominent among those initiatives has been to set
targets for poverty reduction as a means to drive policy. This trend was
represented, perhaps most visibly, by the campaign of John Edwards
for President. Edwards launched and ended his campaign from New
Orleans, the city where, ever so briefly, the realities of deep poverty in
the United States were revealed on an international stage during
Hurricane Katrina.4 5 Edwards pledged during his campaign to end
poverty within a generation." His clearly articulated commitment to
addressing the needs of those in poverty was a central organizing
principle of his campaign, and his presence in the contest drew the
issue into national discourse in a way that arguably had not occurred at
any time since welfare reform. The Edwards campaign was supported
by national calls to set poverty reduction targets. For example, the
Center for American Progress (CAP), an organization formed in 2003
39. Internal Revenue Service, ARRA and the Earned Income Tax Credit,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=205666,00.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2010).
40. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm.
41. Id.
42. THE URBAN INST., supra note 34, at 2.
43. Id. at 2-4.
44. Through TANF or CCDGB allocations, states vary widely in child-care
spending. CLASP reported that in 2007, thirty-one states increased overall spending on
child-care while twenty states decreased spending on child-care. HANNAH MATTHEWS,
CTR. FOR LAw & Soc. POLICY, CHILD CARE ASSISTANCE IN 2007: SPENDING UPDATE 1-
2 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/childcare
assistance2007.pdf.
45. Mark Greenberg, Making Poverty History, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 22,
2009, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=making povertyhistory.
46. John Edwards, John Edwards' Plan to Build One America,
http://www.johnedwards.com/issues/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
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"to provide long-term leadership and support to the progressive
movement,"4 7 issued a 2007 report titled "From Poverty to Prosperity:
A National Strategy to Cut Poverty in Half."4 8 This report advocated
the use of targets as a means to rally government toward effective
programs. The move to targeting has taken hold across the states. As of
December 2009, nine states have officially set such targets.49
In each of these states the initiative to lower poverty is linked to a
poverty council, task force, or commission.o States across the country
have established bodies to address poverty issues. As of December
2009, nineteen states (Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, and Washington), the Virgin Islands, and the District of
Columbia have established such an initiative."
State targeting initiatives have taken different forms, some of them
representing primarily the setting of a target and the issuance of a
report, and others characterized by more robust on-going mechanisms
to evaluate programs in light of their proven ability to meet the target
and to force change in unsuccessful government programs. Many of the
state efforts have focused on the creation of a legislative commission
and the issuance of a report to the legislature. For example, in 2006, in
response to a call from religious leaders to address the needs of those in
poverty, the Minnesota legislature created a commission to end poverty
and charged it with providing recommendations on how to end poverty
in the state by 2020.52 The commission was to issue a report by
47. Center for American Progress, About the Center for American Progress,
http://www.americanprogress.org/aboutus (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
48. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FROM POVERTY TO PROSPERITY: A NATIONAL
STRATEGY TO CUT POVERTY IN HALF (2007), available at http://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2007/04/pdf/povertyreport.pdf.
49. The states are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Vermont, and Virginia. CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, POVERTY
AND OPPORTUNITY: STATE GOVERNMENT TASK FORCES 2 (2009), available at
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/StatewithPovertyComnissions-1.pdf
[hereinafter STATE GOVERNMENT TASK FORCES].
50. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & KRISTEN MICHELLE GORZELANY, CTR. FOR LAW
& SOC. POLICY, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY, SEIZING THE MOMENT:
STATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE NEW COMMITMENT TO REDUCE POVERTY IN AMERICA 36
(2008), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/claspreport_0418.pdf; STATE
GOVERNMENT TASK FORCES, supra note 49, at 2.
51. STATE GOVERNMENT TASK FORCES, supra note 49, at 2; WASH. ST. DEP'T
OF CMTY., TRADE, & ECON. DEV., POVERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE: CHALLENGING
POVERTY IN WASHINGTON 8 (2007), available at http://www.clark.wa.gov/community-
action/documents/CTED%20Poverty%20report.pdf.
52. H.F. No. 4162, 2006 Minn. Laws, ch. 282, art. 2, § 27.
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December 15, 2008, and the commission was to expire by the end of
December 30, 2008.53 Similar efforts were undertaken in Maine and
Washington State.54
Some of the state entities do more than issue a report and
recommendations. For example, in 2008, the Louisiana legislature
created the Child Poverty Prevention Council of Louisiana and the
Child Poverty Prevention Fund. As articulated in its statutory enabling
legislation,
[t]he council shall have as its purpose the goal of pursuing
programs which will reduce child poverty in the state by fifty
percent over the next ten years. The council shall work to
establish public-private partnerships and seek private sector
funding to be used with public funds to support solutions to
poverty initiatives with the greatest potential for reducing
child poverty."
The Council issued its first report in early 2009 and laid out a variety
of detailed policy recommendations.56 The legislation conceptualizes the
body as an ongoing entity. In 2004, Connecticut engaged in a similar
effort.
53. Id. MINN. LEGISLATIVE REPORT: COMMISSION TO END POVERTY IN
MINNESOTA BY 2020 (2009), available at http://www.commissions.leg.state.mn.
us/Icep/LCEP FinalReport SinglePgs.pdf.
54. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 12004-1(6-H) (2009); WASH. ST.
DEP'T OF CMTY., TRADE, & EcoN. DEV., supra note 51, at 8.
55. CHILD POVERTY PREVENTION COUNCIL FOR LA., IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
59 (2009), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/documents/files/CPPC-
Implementation-Plan-2009.pdf (quoting S.B. 660, Reg. Sess. (La. 2008)).
56. Id.
57. CONN. CHILD POVERTY COUNCIL, JANUARY 2006 PROGRESS REPORT 1
(2006), available at http://www.ct.gov/opm/LIB/opm/HHS/CPC/CPCProgress2006
.pdf. Another tremendously interesting example of the use of targets to guide policy is
the Oregon Progress Board. It offers a robust early example of efforts in this respect.
As described by the state, "[tihe Oregon Progress Board is an independent board
created by the Legislature in 1990 to monitor the state's 20-year strategic vision,
Oregon Shines, and keep it current." Oregon Progress Board, About Us,
http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/aboutus.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
Unfortunately, the progress board was recently defunded due to budget cuts, but
Oregon is pursuing alternative means of funding. Id. The progress board issues regular
reports evaluating the state's progress in meeting its benchmarks. See, e.g., OR.
PROGRESS BD., 2009 BENCHMARK REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF OREGON (2009), available
at http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/docs/2009Report/2009_Benchmark Highlights.
pdf. It also maintains an impressive dataset online that enables the public to generate
reports on the state's progress in meeting the benchmarks. See Oregon Progress Board,
Benchmark Report Generator, http://benchmarks.oregon.gov (last visited Feb. 6,
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On the local level, the most prominent effort to address poverty
has taken place in New York City. In 2006, Mayor Michael
Bloomberg-presumably acting within his proscribed executive
powers-convened the Commission for Economic Opportunity
(Commission) to research and design a new poverty policy for the
city. 8 The Commission was composed of business and community
leaders who were hand-selected by the Mayor's office." The
Commission was charged with generating innovative poverty solutions
that the city could execute without significant new expenditures and
without reliance on state or federal action. It issued a report in 2006,
and in 2007, Bloomberg opened a new executive office-The Center for
Economic Opportunity (CEO)-to implement the recommendations of
the report.' Since that time the Commission has overseen the
implementation of a wide variety of programs, has issued multiple
reports on its work, is regularly cited by other jurisdictions and in
Washington as a model for new poverty policies, and is actively
seeking to promote and replicate its work.
Additionally, efforts to reexamine how to measure poverty have
taken hold in a variety of jurisdictions in a purported attempt to lay the
groundwork for more realistic conversations about what domestic
poverty looks like today.62 These efforts have drawn light toward the
tremendously difficult life circumstances of those who-although just
above the current federal poverty measure-still lead lives characterized
by enormous economic vulnerability.
The substantive recommendations and initiatives supported by the
various commissions vary significantly. However, they do share some
characteristics. First, and most significantly in light of the political
2010). The Progress Board not only issues ongoing reports and provides ongoing access
to data, but it is empowered to evaluate existing efforts. The Board has an ongoing
ability to recommend statutory and policy changes, including modification in public
fiscal policies to be carried on by state and local governments, businesses, private
citizens, and other organizations. Board staff assists local communities, wherever
possible, in developing plans measures of success to achieve the goals established. OR.
REV. STAT. § 284.618 (2009). The legislation further mandates that that "[tihe Oregon
Department of Administrative Services shall ensure that state agency activities and
programs are directed towards achieving the Oregon benchmarks." OR. REV. STAT. §
291.110(1) (2009).
58. NYC CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY, STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/ceo_2007
execsum.pdf.
59. Id.
60. NYC Center for Economic Opportunity, About the Center,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceofhtml/aboutlabout.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
61. See infra Part IV.
62. See infra Part IV.A.
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trends discussed above, a significant number of the interventions that
are directed toward adults focus on the working poor. For example,
there is significant support for expansion of federal and state EITC
programs.6 3 Similarly, recommendations to expand access to adult
education focus on those engaged in low-wage work, and multiple
bodies support enhanced child-care funding for the working poor.' A
few states also focus on financial literacy and expansion of Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs)." Although other states including
Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, and Montana mention some improvements
to public assistance, the recommendations generally focus on
63. Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, and New Mexico's state task
forces recommend an expansion of state EITC. ALA. H.R., POVERTY TASK FORCE:
FINAL REPORT 3 (2008); DEL. CHILD POVERTY TASK FORCE, ANALYSIS OF CHILD
POVERTY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN DELAWARE: FINDINGS AND INITIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009), available at http://www.
udel.edu/ccrs/pdf/KC_2009/CPTFExecutiveSummary.pdf; Jessica Noll, Poverty Task
Force Holds First Meeting, KYPoST.CoM, Sept. 21, 2009,
http://www.kypost.com/news/local/story/Poverty-Task-Force-Holds-First-Meeting
/PjOMGyTOLO674WOHwfCuFQ.cspx; MINN. LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 53, at
32; NEW MEXICO GOVERNOR RICHARDSON'S POVERTY REDUCTION TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT 41-42 (2008), available at http://www.tax.state.nm.us/pubs/TaxreseStat/
povertyreductiontaskforcefinalreport.pdf [hereinafter N.M. POVERTY REDUCTION TASK
FORCE].
64. Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, and New Mexico
all included increased child-care support in their respective task force initiatives.
Specific recommendations varied from child-care tax credits, providing affordable
child-care programs and direct child-care subsidies. Many states that included child-
care supports also recommended increased funding for early childhood education and
after-school programs. ALA. H.R., supra note 63, at 2; CONN. CHILD POVERTY
COUNCIL, supra note 57, at 14-16; DEL. CHILD POVERTY TASK FORCE, supra note 63;
Noll, supra note 63; MINN. LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 53, at 35; N.M. POVERTY
REDUCTION TASK FORCE, supra note 63, at 61.
State poverty initiatives in Delaware, Louisiana, Indiana, Kentucky, New
Mexico, and Ohio recommended improvements in adult education. These
recommendations are focused mainly around job or workforce training and
development and expanding GED programs. DEL. CHILD POVERTY TASK FORCE, supra
note 63; CHILD POVERTY PREVENTION COUNCIL FOR LA., supra note 55, at 50-5 1; S.B.
260, 116th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); Noll, supra note 63; N.M. POVERTY
REDUCTION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 63, at 53-66; OHIO ANTI-POVERTY TASK
FORCE, THE OHIO ANTI-POVERTY TASK FORCE REPORT: STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY AND REDUCING POVERTY 8-11 (2009), available at
http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/l/APTF%20final%206.09.pdf.
65. Delaware, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington each included increased
financial literacy or encouraged expansion of IDA programs. IDA programs encourage
individuals to open a savings account through providing matching funds by the state.
DEL. CHILD POVERTY TASK FORCE, supra note 63; OHIO ANTI-POVERTY TASK FORCE,
supra note 64, at 14-15; H.R.J. Res. 6561, 2007 Leg. 404th Sess. (R.I. 2007); WASH.
ST. DEP'T OF CMTY. TRADE & ECON. DEV., supra note 51, at 32.
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coordination and creating uniform eligibility criteria.' Thus there is no
question that the focus of the new poverty agenda has shifted
significantly towards supporting the working poor.67
II. THE SHIFT TO NEW GOVERNANCE IN POVERTY POLICY
Along with the reconfiguration of poverty policy and the shifting
focus towards the needs of the working poor that has taken place in the
last decade, there has been a significant reconceptualization of the
governing structures of poverty programs. Although traditional
government structures still play a significant role, states and localities
increasingly use structures that align, to greater and lesser extents, with
"new governance" theory.
Before proceeding, it is important to define how this Article uses
the terms "new governance" and "traditional governance," and define
the purpose in drawing on that body of literature. "Traditional" or
"old" governance stands, as a theoretical matter, in opposition to new
governance." It is top-down, rule-bound, centralized, government-run
66. See MINN. LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 53, at 37; Mont. Exec. Order
No. 3-2007 (Feb. 22, 2007); MICH. VOICES FOR ACTION, MICHIGAN VOICES FOR
ACTION POVERTY SUMMIT: OVERVIEW (2008).
67. For example, in Ohio recommendations included:
1. Strengthen state investments in housing, healthcare, mental health
and addiction services, and food assistance.
2. Strengthen federal advocacy for housing, food assistance, and work
related tax credits.
3. Streamline and simplify the process for accessing work supports and
other benefits.
4. Coordinate outreach across relevant state agencies and establish data
sharing policies to increase access to work supports and public benefits.
5. Establish a statewide 2-1-1 information and referral system.
6. Improve access to needed supports for seniors and disabled Ohioans.
7. Utilize the Ohio Family Resource Simulator.
8. Endorse and expand Ohio's 21st Century Transportation Priorities
Task Force's recommendations to improve transportation coordination.
9. Protect families in crisis and ensure they have access to basic
utilities including gas, electric, water, and telephone service.
OHIO ANTI-POVERTY TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 6-7.
68. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471,
473 (2004) (responding to Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall ofRegulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004))
(describing new governance scholarship as endeavoring "simultaneously to chronicle,
interpret, analyze, theorize, and advocate a seismic reorientation in both public
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and, in the view of its critics, profoundly resistant to innovation. As
extensively discussed elsewhere in this issue, 69 new governance theory
offers a collaborative model of administrative governance in which a
variety of public and private stakeholders work together to create,
implement, and continually renegotiate programmatic goals and
structures."o It is characterized by public-private collaboration,
experimentation, and localized program design and the ability to test
programs, jettison programs that are not effective and to promote and
bring to a larger scale programs that are. In a new governance model,
government acts not as a centralized rule-maker but as a facilitator of
the experimentalist enterprise. Program improvements occur, over
time, through the experimentalist, evaluative, and orchestration
process. Of particular importance in new governance structures is the
active participation of affected communities within the governance
structure.
When one looks at the newer national, state, city, and
multijurisdictional efforts discussed above, two conclusions become
clear. First, there is a significant mix of "new" and "old" governance
elements. For example, expansion and reformulation of the Food
Stamps program, and national and state initiatives to expand the EITC,
are primarily characterized by old governance mechanisms. In contrast,
the push toward target-setting, re-measuring poverty, and
experimentation more easily fit within the definitions of new
governance. Second, governance mechanisms that are consonant with
new governance theory are becoming increasingly prevalent and
promoted within policy circles. The groups gathered together to address
poverty often mirror some of new governance theory. They are, to
greater and lesser extents, multi-representational public-private
collaborations, and there is a consistent and strong focus on data
collection, evaluation, and orchestration. Strikingly, in the poverty
policymaking process and the tools employed in policy implementation . . . generally
away from the familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by administrative
fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive,
problem-solving New Governance").
69. For a description of the conference and the full list of papers presented,
see the Foreword to this volume.
70. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371-404 (2004).
71. Grbinne de B6rca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law
and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 2, 3
(Grdinne de Bdirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Fung & Wright, supra note 1, at 16-17
(identifying "bottom-up participation" as a central principle of empowered participatory
governance).
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area, however there is a marked lack of intentionally structured
participation by poor people.72
It bears repeating here that the new poverty agenda arose to
respond to what many view as welfare reform's insufficient response to
the conditions of poverty in the U.S.7 3 It also bears repeating that
welfare reform was fairly critiqued as complicit with U.S. poverty
policy's long history of race, class, and gender subordination, and
comes amidst significant evidence of continuing maladministration of
public-benefit programs.74 What, then, of the new poverty agenda? Is it
more responsive or is it also constrained by this history and current
practice? In one sense, these questions have nothing to do with
governing mechanisms and revolve only around the substance of the
program. Programs either are or are not less mired in concepts of
subordination. However, this Article posits that the questions of
subordination are intertwined with conceptions of accountability. In
short, we are more likely to conceptualize and create a more
responsive, less subordinating poverty policy if there are effective
mechanisms for poor people and communities to hold the program
accountable by intervening and advocating for programs that are more
responsive to their needs. In the next Part, this Article turns to these
questions of accountability.
III. OLD AND NEW GOVERNANCE CONCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
72. Of the multiple official bodies discussed supra in Part I, only four-
Alabama, the District of Columbia, Illinois, and Maine-appear to mandate some
participation by members of affected communities in their governing bodies. See ALA.
CODE § 29-2-250 (2009) (mandating that "two individuals living in poverty" be
included among the members of the Alabama Commission to Reduce Poverty, in
addition to members of various community-based organizations); D.C. CODE § 3-631-
632 (establishing the Commission on Poverty and mandating that the commission be
comprised of "no more than 21 members" of which no more than nine shall be
employees of the District of Columbia . . . . Of the remaining, "public" members,
"[n]o fewer than five ... shall be persons who live in census tracts with poverty rates
of at least 20 percent or who have personal experience living in poverty"); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 4080/15 (2009) (mandating that the Illinois Commission on the
Elimination of Poverty include no more than twenty-six voting members, twenty of
whom are from the "public" and two "who have experienced extreme poverty"); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 13171(1) (2009) (mandating that the Maine Council on
Poverty and Economic Security be comprised of twenty-one appointed, voting members
including "[o]ne person who has experienced poverty who is a woman . . . [olne
person who has experienced poverty who is elderly"). Also notable in the Illinois
statute is a reliance on international human rights norms as a basis for the
Commission's work. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 4080/5 (2009).
73. See infra Part IV.A.
74. See infra Part IV.C.
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ALONG Two MEASURES
This Part seeks to evaluate new poverty agenda programs along
two theoretical measures. First, are programs accountable to applicants
and recipients in the sense that benefits are implemented in
conformance with law and fairly and consistently administered to
similarly situated individuals? Second-and particularly importantly for
understanding whether and to what extent new governance structures
provide a means to create more responsive poverty policy-are there
available and effective ways for poor communities to understand and
participate in the process by which decisions about poverty policy are
made? 5
To set the stage for these questions, this Part briefly discusses both
the structure of and some key justifications for the "old governance"
mechanisms that address both these aspects of accountability. Then the
discussion moves to the means by which new governance structures
attempt or fail to provide both forms of accountability. Part IV then
75. These two measures are, of course, interrelated. The first focuses on
implementation and the second focuses on program design and evaluation. An obvious
and crucial additional schema for conceptualizing accountability is that of international
human rights conceptions of social and economic rights. Although a discussion of this
conception of accountability offers a potentially fruitful avenue to impose both the right
to a baseline of economic subsistence as well as a vital conception of progressive
realization of better economic circumstances for the poor, a full discussion of how to
incorporate those norms is well beyond the scope of this Article. For an interesting
discussion of those possibilities, see Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Particioation of
the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the
Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1268907. See also Lobel, supra note 70, at 393 (noting, in a
discussion of the role of "soft law" in new governance that, "[a] second reason to use
soft law involves circumstances in which the gap between the aspired norm and the
existing reality is so large that hard regulatory provisions are meaningless. Many
proposals for social and economic rights in developing countries rest in this rationale.
The underlying idea is that it is better for the normative order to recognize in advance
the impossibility of immediate change and to explicitly acknowledge the space between
real and ideal. Softer mechanisms allow a regime to establish minimum levels of
adherence and to formalize advancement toward higher, aspirational standards"). Along
these lines, it is interesting to note that, with the exception of AFDC's very limited and
state-controlled guarantee to minimal subsistence, "old-governance" institutions offer
and have historically offered virtually nothing along this measure of accountability. Any
hope, in the mid- to late-twentieth century for incorporating any conception of
economically based rights (either through the imposition of heightened scrutiny for
policies involving the poor or any conception of a fundamental right to subsistence) into
a constitutional framework was extinguished with the Supreme Court's decision in
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). DAVIs, supra note 28, at 132. Thus to the
extent that new governance institutions can by themselves, or through outside pressure,
play a role in the realization of those rights, that would be a very positive trend.
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turns to an in depth case study of New York City's experimentation
with poverty policy.
A. Old Governance Structures to Ensure the Accountability of Social-
Welfare Programs
Along the first measure of accountability-that is, accountability to
individuals for the lawful and consistent treatment of similarly situated
individuals-post-New Deal social-welfare programs rely on a variety
of governance mechanisms. Detailed national statutes and regulations
set out specific program rules and federal agencies either administer the
program directly or oversee implementation by the states. Under this
schema, people have a right, individually and collectively, to hold the
government accountable if it fails to provide benefits to which the
individual is entitled under the statutory scheme. Under Goldberg v.
Kelly,16 individuals have a right to a pre-termination administrative
hearing to contest an adverse action by the government." These
hearings, pursuant to Goldberg, apply to subsistence-level cash
assistance" and, through a variety of judicial," legislative, and
administrative"o actions, to a wide range of public benefits. Using
various mechanisms, individuals can bring suit on their own behalf and,
in certain circumstances, on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals." Supervising administrative agencies on both the federal
and state level also have mechanisms-through technical assistance,
oversight, and sanctioning structures-to ensure that states and localities
implement and administer these systems lawfully.82
76. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 264-65.
79. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (establishing a right to
a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits), with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) (holding that a pre-termination hearing is not constitutionally required when
the government seeks to terminate Social Security benefits).
80. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2009) (requiring pre-termination hearings
prior to adverse action for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly Food
Stamps)).
81. Although the availability of federal judicial relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
has been severely curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v.
Dow, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), it does provide a mechanism for enforcement of some
federally conferred rights.
82. For a typical example, see 7 C.F.R. § 276.1-.7 (2009) (describing the
rights and responsibilities of states participating in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance program and the various penalties that the Food and Nutrition Service of the




These structures have provided the primary mechanisms that
lawyers have used in the last several decades to ensure that programs
are lawfully and fairly implemented and administered. Early in the
history of the development of these accountability structures, there was
considerable hope among their proponents that they might lead to
constitutional recognition of some form of positive economic rights.
However, by 1976, with the Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v.
Williams," it was clear that this was not meant to be.84 Nevertheless,
these accountability structures continue to provide a jurisdictional basis
for individuals and attorneys to maintain an essential defensive project:
in short, these mechanisms provide a tool to ensure that the government
delivers what it promises to deliver, and does so in a manner that
comports with constitutional norms.
In the context of evaluating the utility of new governance
structures, it is important to note the continuing importance of these
tools. Across the country, individuals request and prevail at
administrative hearings challenging reduction or termination of
benefits, and lawyers bring suits on behalf of similarly situated
individuals to stop government agencies from violating substantive and
procedural rights." The continued success of these administrative and
litigation strategies8 provides ample evidence that, post welfare reform,
83. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding Maryland's enactment of a maximum
grant system, which granted proportionally fewer benefits to individuals in larger
families, under a rational basis Equal Protection review).
84. DAVIS, supra note 28, at 132.
85. A detailed discussion of these ongoing advocacy efforts is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a detailed listing of examples of this essential work, see
National Center for Law and Economic Justice, In the Courts,
http://nclej.org/courts.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). Examples include Reynolds v.
Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007) (successfully blocking New York City from
unlawfully deterring applicants for Food Stamps and Medicaid); United States v. City
of New York, 359 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that participants in New York
City's welfare experience program were employees for the purpose of a Title VII action
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and therefore stated a cause of action when they alleged
sexual and racial harassment in violation of Title VII); Julia M. v. Scott, 498 F. Supp.
2d 1245 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (holding that Missouri can no longer close the cases of tens
of thousands of children receiving Children's Health Insurance without first giving them
notice of their right to appeal and the opportunity to explain why their case should not
be closed); Doe v. Doar, 807 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (successfully
challenging a New York policy that changed the formula for calculating cash assistance
for needy families that include children receiving federal SSI benefits because of the
child's disabilities).
86. Both fair hearings and systemic litigation against the administrative state
have, of course, been subject to extensive critique. For a discussion of these critiques
and their relationship to the proposals in this Article, see hif notes 191-197 and
accompanying text.
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government benefits programs continue to be operated in ways that
violate the law. In Part V.A, this Article argues that, given this history
and current practice of maladministration and systemic violation of
statutory and constitutional rights, retention of structures to ensure this
form of accountability is essential.
Accountability along the second measure-the presence and
efficacy of means for poor communities to understand and participate in
the process by which decisions about poverty policy are made-exists,
in an old governance framework, almost entirely within mechanisms
that are targeted not specifically to affected communities but instead to
the greater public. First, at the most basic and general level, the
franchise provides an opportunity for the public to elect the leaders that
make law." Beyond this, old governance administrative law structures
offer a variety of tools to ensure that government policy is promulgated
in a way that ensures some level of public access and participation."
For example, freedom of information and sunshine laws allow limited
public access to government records and meetings; and the
Administrative Procedure Act mandates notice of administrative
rulemaking, an opportunity for the public to comment prior to final
promulgation of rules, and mechanisms to sue if an administrative
agency acts outside the boundaries of its statutory mandate.8 9 Each of
these mechanisms provides some generalized access, but it is fair to
critique these mechanisms as tremendously limited in their capacity to
allow for substantive participation.
Thus, in summary, old governance offers mechanisms to support a
crucial defensive project that yields some degree of accountability by
ensuring that programs are governed by clear rules, and by ensuring
fair and consistent application of rules.' It also offers a fairly thin
scheme for participation by affected communities in the social-welfare
87. Fung & Wright, supra note 1, at 4.
88. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRocEss 23-40 (4th ed. 2004).
89. The Sunshine Act was passed because "the public is entitled to the fullest
practicable information regarding the decision-making processes of the Federal
Government." Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat.
1241 (1976). The Act requires that most meetings with agency members be open to the
public and prohibits ex parte communications in formal adjudications or hearings. §§ 3-
4, 90 Stat. 1241-47 (1976); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) ("General notice of
proposed rule making shall be published . .. ."); id. § 553(c) ("[An] agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making . . . ."). Although
the efficacy of these tools for creating accountability in light of shifts in the mode of
governance of social-welfare programs is beyond the scope of this Article, I discussed
that topic extensively in Bach, supra note 9.
90. But see notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
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programs that affect their lives. The question then becomes whether
newer governing forms offer less or more along these measures of
accountability.
B. New Governance Conceptions of Accountability
The form of individualized and class-based first-measure
accountability of the type described above stands in fairly stark
opposition to new governance principles. Many new governance
scholars explicitly represent new governance structures as turning away
from a highly detailed, rule-bound, rights-based, litigation-centered
conception of democratic accountability. 9' For example, in their
introduction to Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, de
Bfirca and Scott describe that a "characteristic often present in new
governance processes is the voluntary or non-binding nature of the
norms."' To the extent that first-measure accountability is predicated
on the existence of fixed, detailed, enforceable rules, then it is, at least
at first blush, in significant tension with the experimentalist nature of
new governance structures. New governance structures are consistently
described as characterized by softness, flexibility, and
experimentation.93
Despite what appears on the surface of new governance theory as a
rejection of first-measure accountability, this Article will argue that, in
the field of social-welfare programs, this is not necessarily the case.94
However, two characteristics of governing structures that can play a
role in newer governing forms do undermine first-measure
accountability and merit some consideration here: privatization9 5 and
the move toward "softness in law."
The impact of privatization on first-measure accountability is quite
clear. Although privatization need not necessarily diminish the
possibility of individualized accountability, in several recent examples,
91. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litgation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015, 1021-22 (2004)
(describing the "command-and-control" orientation as characterized by "an effort to
anticipate and express all the key directives needed to induce compliance in a single,
comprehensive, and hard-to-change decree" and describing a "growing and promising
shift from command-and-control to experimentalist intervention").
92. de Bdrca & Scott, supra note 71, at 3.
93. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 91 (describing new governance
structures as an explicit rejection of traditional rights jurisprudence).
94. See infra Part V.A.
95. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 9, at 295-96 (discussing the role of
privatization in new social-welfare policy programs).
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that has in fact been the case.' First, to the extent that privatization
involves the use of incentive-based contracts that do not dictate specific
modes of interaction but instead pay vendors for achieving particular
outcomes, interactions between the contractors and individual program
participants are not governed by specific rules. This leads to serious
individual accountability problems.' In addition, to the extent that
functions previously undertaken by the government are, in a new
governance regime, being conducted by private entities, there is a
substantial question as to whether the private entity would be seen as a
"state actor" for the purposes of various accountability theories." As a
result of these structural problems with first-measure accountability in
privatized settings, any newer governing model that might incorporate
first-measure accountability must address these failures.'
Although the degree and nature of "softness in law" necessary to
create a new governance structure is an area of substantial dispute,o
some degree of flexibility in legal rules and a softening of some of the
administrative state's ability and inclination to sanction those that fail to
comply with rules is certainly an aspect of new governance.' To the
extent that softness in law is equated with the absence of detailed rules
regarding program administration and a diminishment in the authority
of courts to create enforceable orders, this affects the strength of first-
measure accountability. However, despite the seeming tension between
new governance and first-measure accountability, the case studies
96. For examples of situations illustrating the shift to using private actors and
entities to carry out social-welfare programs and the accountability problems that can
arise in those circumstances, see, e.g., Bach, supra note 9; Barbara L. Bezdek,
Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local
Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559
(2001); Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion,
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121 (2000).
97. See generally Bach, supra note 9.
98. Id. at 295-96.
99. The individualized accountability concerns that arise in privatized
environments are of particular concern because of the link, in privatized social-welfare
programs, between the use of private vendors and the implementation of punitive
programs. In one recent example, a set of contracts between the New York City social-
service agency and private entities to run a welfare-to-work program resulted in a
program that, although it purported to attempt to move people from welfare to work,
turned out to be far more effective at punishing recipients (76 percent were punished
for alleged failures to comply) than at placing the in jobs (8 percent were placed). See
generally id. at 278-92. Given the link between the implementation of punitive policies
and the use of privatization, questions of accountability along the first measure are
crucial.
100. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 68, at 485-89.
101. Lobel, supra note 70, at 388-95.
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below suggest that in certain circumstances, inclusion of structures to
ensure first-measure accountability might not only provide an important
defensive mechanism on the ground but might also be designed to
augment rather than undermine new governance goals. This Article
returns to that possibility in Part V.
C. New Governance Offers a Detailed Schema for Enhancing the
Participation of Affected Communities
In contrast to the first measure of accountability, new governance
theory and practice purports to significantly deepen and broaden
accountability along the second measure-the ability of affected
communities to participate in the design and evaluation of programs that
affect their lives.
New governance is linked to a perceived democracy deficit 02 in
current and historical government systems. Archon Fung and Erik Olin
Wright, in their seminal work on Empowered Participatory Governance
(EPG), provide a clear articulation of this theory. As they frame their
project, EPG offers a response to the failure of the "institutional forms
of liberal democracy . . . to [address] the novel problems we face in the
twenty-first century." According to Fung and Wright the current
governance crisis is a failure of our democracies to live up to
the central ideals of democratic politics: facilitating active
political involvement of the citizenry, forging political
consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing
public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy
society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the
democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the
nation's wealth.103
In Fung and Wright's iteration, then, new governance is a means to
"[shift] to a more advanced form of public, deliberative
participation."104
102. Id. at 360.
103. Fung & Wright, supra note 1, at 3.
104. Lobel, supra note 70, at 356. Lobel makes an important point, however,
that new governance must struggle at the margin between a conception of populist,
direct control and a Madisonian conception of representative democracy. Id. at 453 ("A
second challenge posed by the shift to a governance model is striking a balance between
the value of direct participation and the need for a high-quality representative
democracy . . . . Under the new model, the valuation of direct engagement and
experience risks becoming too populist. The Renew Deal should not abandon a
264
2010:239 Governance, Accountability, New Poverty 265
To the extent that new governance in fact moves towards a deeper
conception of democratic accountability, it does so through, in the first
instance, enhancement of the opportunities for substantive participation
by affected communities."o5 Affected communities participate in the
setting of policy and, ideally, are positioned to continually insist on
responsive institutions and programs. "Participation and partnership"
are set up in opposition to the centralized, expert control that
characterizes "old governance."' " So, in examples highlighted by Fung
and Wright, decision-making authority is devolved to neighborhood
governance councils in Chicago or local participatory bodies
deliberating over city budgets in Porto Alegre, Brazil."' Closely related
to the commitment to broad-based participation are a variety of
structures that enhance the meaningfulness of that participation. New
governance forms are local, in large part because localization is said to
promote grassroots participation.os New governance projects are
subject to robust forms of transparency to promote ongoing evaluation
by a variety of insider and outsider actors.'" They are subject to
Madisonian notion of democracy, based on checks and balances among branches of
government backed by expert agencies.").
105. See, e.g., Fung & Wright, supra note 1, at 16-17; NeJaime, supra note 4,
at 332.
106. In these structures external participation is, in theory, posited as essential
rather than threatening to the governing enterprise. Lobel, supra note 70, at 371-73.
107. Fung & Wright, supra note 1, at 5.
108. Lobel, supra note 70, at 384. Another fundamental aspect of new
governance is decentralization. One rationale for decentralization is its capacity to
increase democratic engagement. "[D]ecentralization follows naturally from the
generation of multiple links among groups and individuals. The aspiration of the
governance model is that increased engagement will contribute to the building of
deliberative and collaborative capacities, thus sustaining an environment for democratic
engagement." Id.
109. Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Leaining, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 324 (Grdinne de Bfirca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) ("New Governance's traction depends upon strategically
located actors engaged in ongoing and insistent questioning about the adequacy of the
status quo and efforts to reform it."). Sturm also highlights the necessity of outsider
participation in the governance enterprise:
Outsiders . . . by definition, do not occupy formal positions of power, and
thus are less subject to the pressures of order maintenance and power
preservation that militate against destabilizing the status quo. . . . This
participation value lies at the core of democratic principle and fair process.
Citizen participation is particularly important in addressing complex
problems because most problems are not exclusively technical; they
necessarily involve prioritising and choosing among values under conditions
of scarce resources. For that reason, ongoing participation by those affected
is needed if they are to have influence when value choices are actually
made.
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rigorous evaluation and peer review, as a means to continually
reevaluate their effectiveness. And finally, local efforts are ideally
linked to larger scale coordination so that successful experiments can be
promoted and implemented more widely."o "Institutional design based
on inclusion and the proliferation of normative authorities encourages
the adoption of a wide variety of approaches, methodologies, and
practices. This design must be coupled with the development of
comparative measures to assess the relative success of varying methods
in comparable circumstances.""
The success of these participatory structures to promote
accountability along the second measure has been subject to multiple
critiques. These critiques are instructive in examining the new poverty
agenda. First, and most simply, although some new governance
programs comport with conceptions of deepened democracy, many do
not place primary value on that norm. Particularly in the social-welfare
field, the programs described in Part II are characterized, to varying
degrees, by experimentation, devolution, public-private partnerships,
and orchestration, but rarely seek to include any poor people or any
organizations controlled by poor people in their deliberative governing
bodies. In the multiple commissions and bodies described in Part II, a
small minority mandated participation by poor people in the governing
enterprise." 2 So in that very basic sense, these bodies fail to live up to
the second-measure accountability norms at the heart of democratically
motivated new governance enterprises.
Even if the institutions of the new poverty agenda were in fact
participatory as envisioned by new governance theory, given the long
history of using social-welfare policy as a tool of gender, race, and
class subordination,' " it is not clear that deliberative governance bodies
Id. at 330.
110. Lobel, supra note 70, at 400 ("While power is decentralized to allow local
knowledge to match solutions to their individual circumstances, decentralization must
be coupled with regional and national commitments to coordinate local efforts and
communicate lessons in a comprehensive manner. . . . The role of government is to
promote and standardize innovations that began locally and privately. Scaling up,
facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and researching and replicating
success stories from local or private levels are central goals of government.");
NeJaime, supra note 4, at 336 ("New Governance distinguishes itself from mere
informal negotiated policymaking by deliberately constructing a process that is
inclusive, making that process transparent, and imbuing the outcomes of the process
with flexibility by consistently engaging in reflection and revision.").
111. Lobel, supra note 70, at 380.
112. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
113. See generaliy]FRANCEs Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING
THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971); see also supra notes 23-27 and
accompanying text.
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can be structured to account and correct for those power imbalances.
As disturbingly framed by NeJaime, "[p]urportedly participatory
processes may in some instances merely reinscribe existing power
dynamics, leaving outsider interests on the outside. Moreover,
contesting outcomes becomes more difficult when such outcomes carry
the presumption of community endorsement."ll 4 Fung and Wright, in
describing the necessary enabling conditions for effective EPG, identify
power imbalances as a significant obstacle to effective participatory
governance:
Most fundamentally, perhaps, the likelihood that these
institutional designs will generate desired effects depends
significantly upon the balances of power between actors
engaged in EPG, and in particular the configurations of non-
deliberative power that constitute the terrain upon which
structured deliberation inside EPG occurs. Participants will be
much more likely to engage in earnest deliberation when
alternatives to it-such as strategic domination or exit from
the process altogether-are made less attractive by roughly
balanced power."'
Fung and Wright make clear that, in their estimation, absolute
equality need not exist, but, in the face of power imbalances, a variety
of factors might come together to enable deliberation even in the face of
power imbalances. They identify "self-conscious institutional design
efforts" as one key. "When administrators or legislators endow parents
with the power to fire school principals or popular councils with
authority for reviewing village budgets, they put citizens and local
experts on a more equal footing." 1 6 In addition, the presence of strong
outsider groups such as "community organizations, labor unions, and
advocacy groups often check the tendencies of both officials and groups
of citizens to commandeer ostensibly deliberative processes to advance
their own narrow ends."" 7
The central role of evaluation and its potential complicity with
subordination also poses related, extraordinarily difficult questions. Of
114. NeJaime, supra note 4, at 348.
115. Fung & Wright, supra note 1, at 23.
116. Id.
117. Id. For an interesting and nuanced discussion of how the incorporation of
some "hard law" mandates for participation might address some of these power
imbalances, see Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance:
Lessons from Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 117 (2009).
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particular concern is the strategic use or misuse of data to support
ideological or partisan positions and the control of evaluation by entities
that accept inequality as a given."' The critiques about power
imbalance and strategic misuse of data are, of course, interlocking. If
participation by affected, subordinated communities is either non-
existent (as it appears to be in much of the new poverty agenda) or
otherwise ineffective-or if the peers participating in the design,
evaluation, and implementation of the programs are willing to accept as
inevitable political compromises that may not be acceptable to those
communities themselves-then data and studies about program
118. David Super, in his scathing critique of the use of new governance
structures in poverty policy, focuses strongly on the problems of selective, political use
of data. He says
[i]n practice, both sides' reliance on research can be selective. Moreover,
even tendentious studies with fundamental, well-documented flaws have
proven influential and been cited by policymakers if they supported those
policymakers' normative stance. . . . Whatever role that research evidence
may have played in resolving particular policy disputes, however,
experimentalism did shift the terms of the debate from broader societal
problems that are difficult to measure, such as racism, to criticism of low-
income people's behavior.
David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Failure ofAntipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 581 (2008). As he argues,
[d]emocratic experimentalism assumes that reliable metrics exist, and can
be readily agreed upon and implemented, for measuring policies'
effectiveness. These metrics must produce reliable results relatively quickly
so that the community may correct defective policies. Without such metrics,
local policy variations will be experiments in name only. This assumption is
obviously linked to the preceding two: without an agreement on the nature
of the problem and the objectives of public action-including how to
balance competing objectives-no consensus metrics are possible.
Id. at 556. Super is focusing here primarily on welfare reform and the passage and
implementation of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families in 1996. Super is certainly
correct that TANF has been used as a means to veil the imposition of extraordinary
harsh policies directed at poor people. He is also correct in implying that the rhetoric of
behavioral control and widespread and racialized gender subordination played a key
role in the design and implementation of TANF, although it is quite clear that this is not
a new phenomena. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. For an account of
how elements of federal TANF policy result in extraordinarily punitive welfare
policies, see Bach, supra note 9. However, it is not clear that TANF falls within new
governance structures. TANF is characterized by devolution and abandonment of the
safety net, among other things. Id. at 278-80. But it is not in any way committed to
engendering the participation of affected communities in program design and evaluation
nor does it have a robust framework for transparency. In this sense, although some of
its devolutionary structure and experimentalist rhetoric sounds like new governance, it
is quite different. Nevertheless, the problem Professor Super identifies-the strategic
use or misuse of data to subordinate program recipients-is a significant danger that
must be accounted for in functioning new governance structures.
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effectiveness are, potentially, of very little use in rendering programs
accountable along the second measure. The case study below focuses,
in large part, on the role of political compromise in framing empirical
inquiry in the new poverty agenda. It suggests that, in order promote
second-measure accountability, one must pay careful attention both to
particular robust forms of transparency and to ensuring that
participation is broad and multifaceted enough to counter these
subordinating phenomena.
IV. NEW YORK CITY'S CENTER FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY:
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND RE-MEASURING POVERTY
Emerging poverty policy is, in significant and growing aspects,
characterized by new governance concepts. The extent to which any
particular governance structure or programmatic endeavor is on all
fours with every aspect of new governance theory certainly varies
significantly. Nevertheless, conceptions of devolution, localization,
public-private collaboration, and a dedication to ongoing evaluation and
revision in light of evaluation are increasingly prevalent.119 This Part
focuses on two highly promoted initiatives taken on by New York
City's Center for Economic Opportunity. The first is its
experimentation with conditional cash transfers as a means to alleviate
long-term poverty, and the second is the City's efforts to implement
and promote nationally a re-measurement of the poverty line. CEO
itself sounds strongly in new governance and is, in many respects, at
the forefront of the new poverty agenda. Because of this, these
programs offer cogent lessons both about the substance and
accountability of mechanisms within the emerging new poverty agenda.
Specifically, CEO's conditional cash-transfer program turns away from
first-measure accountability by divorcing programming entirely from
structures for individuals to enforce programmatic rights. On the
second measure, both the conditional cash-transfer program and re-
measurement of poverty offer a disturbing view of the way that
seemingly objective empirical measures are both complicit in
subordination of poor people and are structurally fairly impervious to
challenge by affected communities.
A. New York City's Center for Economic Opportunity
New York City's CEO exemplifies both the substantive and
governance trends described above and is a prominent and highly
119. See supra Part II.
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promoted example of the new domestic programs that purport to move
people out of poverty. Using words and structures that align with new
governance, the Mayor of New York City has described CEO as "an
innovation lab to test a diverse new generation of anti-poverty
programs. "120 CEO focuses on "the design, implementation, and
evaluation of innovative programs . . . ."121 Among its key strategic
approaches are "[u]sing data and evaluation to improve programs and
allocate resources based on measurable results" and "[s]haring lessons
learned and advocating on a national level for strategies shown to make
a difference."1 22 CEO is often described-and describes itself-as
leading innovation in the area of urban poverty. For example, CEO was
recently named a finalist for the Harvard's Kennedy School's
Innovation in American Government award. 123 Moreover, CEO's
adherence to conceptions of experimentation, evaluation, and national
level orchestration is evident from its recent proposal to create a
Federal Urban Innovation Fund, which would bring CEO's model to a
national scale. 124
Because of both the consonance of CEO's work with much of new
governance theory, and the prominent role it is playing among centrist
and progressive organizations in forging the new poverty agenda, the
accountability and responsiveness mechanisms it offers or fails to offer
merit close examination.
B. Oppoitmzity NYC
A CEO central initiative is Opportunity NYC, a privately funded
$63 million pilot conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in which
120. Michael R. Bloomberg, Introduction to NYC CTR. FOR ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY, EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2009), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/early_achievementreport_2008.pdf.
121. NYC CTR. FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS AND
LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/
earlyachievement-report 2008.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Press Release, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Ash Inst. for Democratic
Governance & Innovation, Innovations in American Government Finalists Announced
(May 18, 2009), http://ash.harvard.edu/Home/News-Events/Press-Releases/
Innovations-Finalists-Announced. See also Center for American Progress, Advancing
Opportunity in New York City: Next Steps for the City, Lessons for the Nation,
Summary of Event (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/events/
2009/04/nyc.html.
124. NYC CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY, THE CITY OF NEW YORK'S PROPOSAL
FOR A FEDERAL URBAN INNOVATION FUND, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/htmi/ceo/downloads/pdf/innovationfundjanuary_2009.pdf.
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low-income families and children receive cash transfers, in exchange
for performing specific actions in the areas of adult workforce and
training participation, child education, and family health. 125  The
program was launched in the fall of 2007 and is scheduled to operate
for two to three years. Its impact on participating families will be
studied for a minimum of five years.126
By way of brief background, Opportunity NYC 27 is the first large-
scale implementation of a CCT program in the United States. The basic
framework for CCT is as follows: individuals or families receive
payments for engaging in particular behaviors, traditionally in the areas
of children's education and health.128 For example, a family will receive
a cash payment for meeting a school-attendance target or ensuring that
children attend health visits or receive vaccinations.129 CCT programs
were developed and have grown exponentially and internationally over
125. See NYC Center for Economic Opportunity, Opportunity NYC,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/html/programs/opportunitynyc.shtml (last visited Mar.
23, 2010).
126. NYC CTR. FOR EcON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 58, at 25. Prior to the
finalization of this Article, MDRC, the research organization that helped design and is
responsible for evaluating the Family Reward program, released a preliminary report
on the program. OPPORTUNITY NYC, TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY ACROSS
GENERATIONS: EARLY FINDINGS FROM NEW YORK CITY'S CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER
PROGRAM (2010), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/549/full.pdf
[hereinafter TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY]. Although the press focused on the lack of
current plans to continue the program as a signal that the city considered it a failure, the
press release issued by New York City stressed that the report indicated some positive
results and would lend data to the ongoing effort to determine whether or not CCT
programs are effective. Compare Kate Lucadamo, Poor Results Doom Anti-Poverty
Project Opportunity NYC, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 31, 2010, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2010/03/31/2010-03-31_poor
resultscashin antipovertyproject.html, and Julie Bosman, City Will Stop Paying the
Poor for Good Behavior, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/nyregion/31cash.html?hp, with Press Release,
Mayor Bloomberg Announces Early Findings of Nation's First-Ever Conditional Cash
Transfer Program (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/portal/press-releaseredirect.
jsp?pagelD= mayorpress release&catlD= 1194&docname=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.
nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2010a%2Fprl38-10.htmfl&cc=unusedl 978
&rc= 1194&ndi= 1.
127. Opportunity NYC consists of three distinct programs. The first and largest
is Family Rewards, a program in which parents and children receive financial
compensation for meeting goals in the areas of adult workforce or training
participation, child education, and family health. The second is WorkRewards, in
which families living in subsidized housing receive a combination of conditional cash
transfer payments and federally funded services, and the third is Spark, a program that
provides cash incentives to students for meeting educational targets. Id. at 25-29.
128. ARIEL FISZBEIN & NORBERT SCHADY, CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS:
REDUCING PRESENT AND FUTURE POVERTY 1 (2009).
129. Id.
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the last several years as a bold new set of initiatives in poverty policy.
The most famous program started in Mexico. That program, which was
designed to replace a large-scale agricultural subsidy program,' began
as a pilot initiative and grew from a program serving 300,000
individuals in 1997 to current coverage of about 5 million
households. 13 1 In 1997, there were a few scattered programs, primarily
in Mexico and South America. By 2008, there were active programs in
virtually every country in Central and South America, and many
programs in various states of development in the Middle East, Africa,
Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. 132 CCT programs are regularly referred
to as a "magic bullet" in development policy.1 33
CCT programs are generally justified as addressing two
simultaneous goals. Cash transfers alleviate immediate poverty by
raising the income of families in the short-term. CCT programs are
thought to promote "human capital investment" by incentivizing
families to engage in activities that are deemed to be likely to reduce
poverty in the long-term.'34 The assumption underlying the imposition
of conditions as a price for receiving the cash transfer is generally
framed in terms of market failure. For a variety of reasons, families are
perceived as acting against the long-term economic interest of their
children.135 Cash transfers are designed to correct these failures by
creating an incentive to act differently.136 To take a prominent example,
several programs give money to mothers if their children attend school
and attend required health visits.'3 7 In addition, in some programs,
school-attendance payments are higher for girls than for boys."' The
payments both transfer money to some poor families (those that comply
with the behavioral requirement) and presumably produce children
who, by benefit of receiving additional education and health care, will
be less likely to remain in poverty in the future. The cash transfer
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 31-32.
132. Id. at 31-34. In 1997, two countries, Mexico and Brazil, were running a
conditional cash transfer program; by 2007, "29 developing countries had some type of
CCT program in place . .. and many other countries were planning one." Id.
133. Id. at 29.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 8-9.
137. Id. at 1; Laura B. Rawlings & Gloria M. Rubio, Evaluating the Impact of
Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Lessons from Latin America 4 (World Bank,
Working Paper No. 3119, 2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/30/0000949460309160409264/Rendere
d/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
138. FISZBEIN & SCHADY, supra note 128, at 81.
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allows the family to choose education over wage labor for their
children.
Opportunity NYC was established as a pilot initiative that was
designed to be studied and, crucially for its short-term political
viability, the program itself is wholly privately funded. Despite its
current state as a privately funded program, it is quite clear that, given
the extraordinarily high cost, if the program succeeds and proposals are
made to bring it to scale, it would have to become a publicly funded
program.
Opportunity NYC is overseen by the Mayor's Center for
Economic Opportunity but is administered by a group of non-profit
organizations.13 Under the terms of its largest program, Family
Rewards, 2,389 families living below 130 percent of the federal
poverty line in targeted high-poverty neighborhoods and having
children in designated grades enrolled in the program in fall 2007.'40 At
the same time, an equal number with the same characteristics were
assigned to a control group. 14 ' The families in the program group fully
participate in the rewards program and are paid at regular intervals for
meeting a set of targets in the areas of workforce participation,
children's educational progress and family health. For example,
families are paid $25 for attending a parent-teacher conference, $150
per month for holding down a full-time job, or $200 for attending a
preventative health screening. 142 In total, families can receive up to
$7,000 a year 43 for participating in the program, although in practice
participants receive significantly less." Interestingly for the purposes
of discussing first-measure accountability, although program
participants can reach out informally to the non-profit organizations
administering the program and have access to a centralized hotline if
139. NYC CTR. FOR EcON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 58, at 20-21, 25.
140. CYNTHIA MILLER ET AL., A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT EARLY EDUCATIONAL
RESULTS OF THE OPPORTUNITY NYC - FAMILY REWARDS PROGRAM 4 (2009), available
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/prelimary_look-early_education-onyc.
pdf; see also NYC CTR. FOR EcON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 58, at 24.
141. MILLER ET AL., supra note 140, at 4.
142. TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY, supra note 126, at 19-21.
143. Id. at 235.
144. Id. at 96 (noting that families enrolled in the program received an average
of about $3,100 in reward payments).
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they believe they have not received "rewards" that they "earned,"l 45
there is no formal appeal or compliance mechanism.'4
A central and defining feature of Opportunity NYC-and a central
new governance feature-is its dual design as both a poverty program
and an object of study. MDRC-the private, non-profit research
organization charged with evaluating the program-will use detailed
quantitative and qualitative measures to study outcomes for both the
program and control group for five years.147 The program will be
evaluated for its success in "alleviating poverty in the short run,
improving health, education and self-sufficiency outcomes in the
intermediate term, and reducing intergenerational poverty in the long
term. "148
Despite the ambitious and, in many respects, thorough research
agenda inherent in the design of Opportunity NYC, from the
perspective of answering fundamental questions about the program, the
research design is fundamentally flawed. From the outset, the program
was criticized by low-income-led community groups as infected with
bias. In short, poor women and their allies were insulted by the
suggestion that poor women would not act in ways that supported their
children's education or health absent a financial incentive to do so.149
145. Id. at 85-88 (noting that families enrolled in the program received an
average of about $3,100 in reward payments).
146. Meeting between Members of the Social-Welfare Law Committee of the
New York City Bar Association and Senior Staff at SEEDCO in New York City (Apr.
7, 2008) (on file with author).
147. MILLER ET AL., supra note 140, at 1.
148. NYC CTR. FOR EcON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 58, at 26. For a more
detailed discussion of the plans to evaluate the program, see TOWARD REDUCED
POVERTY, supra note 126, at 260.
149. See, e.g., Jarrett Murphy, City Limits Investigates: Today's Anti-Poverty
Fight, CITY LIMITs, Apr. 21, 2008, http://www.citylimits.org/news/article.
cfm?articleid=3541 [hereinafter Murphy, Today's Anti-Poverty Fight]; Posting of
Maureen Lane to DMI Blog, Conservatives Flummoxed By Poverty to DMI Blog,
http://www.dmiblog.com/archives/2007/09/post_13.html (Sept. 20, 2007, 13:32 EST)
(characterizing Opportunity NYC as "charity" rather than "policy"). One program
participant, who was the co-chair of Community Voices Heard, a membership-led
activist group in New York City, stated that:
People seem enthused-$25 for some families might make a difference if
their kid can get something to wear for the first day of school . . . . But
they also have the same questions: Why do you think I need to be paid to do
these types of things?
Murphy, Today's Anti-Poverty Fight, supra (internal quotations omitted). These
reactions can be contextualized within a long history of centering poverty policy around
negative assumptions about those in poverty, assumptions that are themselves
intertwined with racialized gender subordination. For example, the clearly sexualized
and racialized negative image of the "welfare queen," was in many senses at the center
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An obvious solution to this problem was that, at the very least, the
program should include a non-conditional control-a group that would
receive payments without complying with behavioral requirements-to
test the assumption of the program that the imposition of the
conditionality is necessary to achieve any particular positive outcome. 50
Despite this critique and suggestion, the program's designers,
principally the Center for Economic Opportunity and MDRC, decided
against that option and retained only the two groups: the program group
that receives payments based on complying with conditions, and the
control with the same demographic profile that receives no payments.
Although at this point the outcome data for Opportunity NYC
necessarily focuses only on short-term effects,'"' there is some
international data to suggest that, any positive results may not flow
from the imposition of the conditionality itself.'52 For example,
of the late 1990s elimination of AFDC. QUADAGNO, supra note 23, at 1. Similarly here,
and as will be discussed further below, the imposition of the conditionality assume that,
absent coercion, women will not act in the best interest of their children. See infra
notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
150. This problem was not lost on progressives critiquing the program. An
investigative report by City Limits Investigates (a progressive New York City journal)
found that
[w]hat won't be assessed, though, is whether any of the measured changes
in people's lives occur because they go to the doctor or attend parent-
teacher conferences-or simply because they got the cash. The money itself
could make a major difference. In fact, one question that Killett [a
participant in the program and the co-chair of Community Voices Heard, a
low-income activist group in New York City] and other low-income
activists have asked is whether it wouldn't be just as effective to give out
small cash grants at the beginning of each month, so parents could actually
use it for, say, train fare or a sitter to enable them to go to the doctor.
Neil deMause, Building A Better Bootstrap: Can Mayor Bloomberg Really Tackle
Poverty One Incentive at a Time?, CITY LIMITS INVESTIGATES, Spring 2008, at 4, 12. In
response to questioning on the possibility of an unconditional control, Jim Riccio, the
principal researcher at MDRC, responded that "it was decided that, 'it was going to be
complicated enough to test this basic model,' without adding another variable." Id. at
10-12.
151. See generally MILLER ET AL., supra note 140, at 4; TOWARD REDUCED
POVERTY, supra note 126.
152. Prior to the finalization of this Article, MDRC released a report laying out
early findings on Opportunity NYC's Family Rewards program. See generally TOWARD
REDUCED POVERTY, supra note 126. The report provides extensive preliminary
evidence of the program's impact in the first two years of its operation. Because of the
date of publication of the MDRC report and its preliminary nature, an extensive
discussion of its findings is not included here. However, some of the most significant
findings include, as might be expected, significant positive effects on poverty rates and
more moderate short term positive effects on material hardship. Id. at 145. For
example, program participants' household income increased by approximately 23
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internationally, it is quite clear that CCT programs have a significant
effect on things like school attendance, and there is some evidence to
show that they correlate positively with improvements in child health.'5 3
At least one study, however, identifies similar positive effects on infant
morbidity and mortality in non-CCT settings, and others indicate
positive effects on both school attendance and health from non-CCTs.154
percent when compared to the control group. Id. at 125-26. Program participants
experienced some small but significant improvements in material hardship. Id. at 124-
38. In addition, although the data is preliminary, the results on the behavioral, or, in
the words of the program, human capital investment, were more mixed. Although it is
too early to draw significant conclusions from the York City data, the preliminary
results are fairly consistent with the international studies. Because of the early nature of
these findings the report does not provide any data on the long range economic,
behavioral or non-behavioral impacts of the program. And, as noted below, due to the
absence of a non-conditional control, neither this report or any subsequent report will
be able to analyze whether or not any positive impacts might occur absent the
imposition of the conditionalities.
153. There is no question that CCT programs are effective at reducing poverty
and increasing utilization of targeted services, positively affecting, for example, school
enrollment rates and utilization of preventative health. FISZBEIN & SCHADY, supra note
128, at 16-20. The evidence of the impact on "final" or non-behavioral outcomes in
more mixed. "Some (but by no means all) evaluations have found that CCTs
contributed to improvements in child height among some population groups; there is
also some evidence that program beneficiaries have better health status." Id. at 20. In
regard to final education outcomes, "a number of evaluations have concluded that the
higher enrollment levels have not resulted in better performance on achievement tests."
Id. at 21.
154. Christina Paxson & Norbert Schady, Does Money Matter? The Effects of
Cash Transfers on Child Health and Development in Rural Ecuador 2 (World Bank,
Working Paper No. 4226, 2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/05/03/00001640620070503092958/Re
ndered/PDF/wps4226.pdf. This program, which was one in a series of impact
evaluation reports issued by the World Bank,
is of particular interest because, unlike other transfer programs that have
been implemented recently in Latin America, receipt of the cash transfers
was not conditioned on specific parental actions, such as taking children to
health clinics or sending them to school. This feature of the program makes
it possible to assess whether conditionality is necessary for programs to
have beneficial effects on children.
Id. The authors found that the program had, "positive effects on the physical,
cognitive, and socio-emotional development of children . . ." Id. For another example
of the positive effects of non-CCTs on both behavioral and non-behavioral positive
indicia of improvement, see Armando Barrientos, Social Transfer and Growth: A
Review 30 (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Working Paper No. 112, 2008),
available at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publicationfiles/WP1 12
Barrientos-Scott.pdf ("The evidence on the capacity of social transfers to facilitate
investment in human development is not limited to transfer programmes targeting
human development or children. Studies on the impact of social pension receipt in
South Africa and Brazil, for example, find that households with a pension beneficiary
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The imposition of the conditionality then amounts not to a correction of
a "market failure," as the literature suggests, or, more colloquially, as
an assistance for families who want to make "good choices" for their
families, but to something different. If in fact, as the international
literature suggests, the conditionality affects only behavior and not,
necessarily, long-term, non-behavioral indicia of improved well-being,
then the program is, like welfare reform and like much of the poverty
programs that preceded it, one focused on changing the behavior of
poor, stereotypically women of color deemed deviant by the powers
that be and depriving the "non-deserving" of aid.15
Despite the import of these questions, the evaluation of
Opportunity NYC will never have data on these questions. Just as the
designers of Opportunity NYC may be right that imposition of the
condition is a key to any program success, the argument articulated
above might also be true: any positive outcome may be due not to the
imposition of the condition but to the cash transfer itself. However, the
point is that the program evaluation is designed in such a way that the
supposition argued above can never be tested. Due to the lack of a
control group that receives payments absent any conditions, in the event
that the program results in "positive outcomes" there will be no way to
tell whether those outcomes are dependent on the imposition of the
conditionality or whether the outcomes would have arisen or would
perhaps even have been better in a program where equivalent cash
transfers were made to similarly situated families without the
imposition of conditions."' Thus the central critique of the program by
low-income groups and their advocates, that the program ignores
structural factors leading to poverty by reinforcing "the impression that
if everybody would just work hard enough and change their personal
have higher enrolment rates among children of school age and improved health
status."). While this is by no means definitive proof that the imposition of the condition
is not necessary to achieve positive behavioral or final outcomes, it does raise a
question that MDRC's research on CCTs is not being designed to address.
155. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
156. The problems that arise from the lack of a non-conditional control are not
unique to the New York City program. In fact, the authors of the World Bank's recent
book on CCT programs acknowledge this absence as a fundamental problem to ideal
evaluation of CCT programs. See FISZBEIN & SCHADY, SUpra note 128, at 156 ("Ideally,
to disentangle the effect of conditions from the income effect inherent in the transfer, an
experiment would be designed whereby a first group of households or villages receives
a UCT [unconditional cash transfer], a second group receives a CCT, and a third group
serves as a control group. That experiment has not yet been conducted anywhere.").
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behavior we could solve poverty in this country"5 7 will remain despite
its untestability under the current study design. Moreover the problem
with failing to test this assumption is not just one of insult. The
retention of conditionality in any future, publicly funded program
imposes a real and significant cost on participants. Every failure to
meet the condition, whether intentional or not, costs the family dollars.
For families living below 130 percent of the federal poverty level, this
is a high price to pay for an assumption that can never be tested. 1
As a result of the research design, at best outcome research will
result in endorsements of programs modeled on Opportunity NYC, or
endorsements of other programs, such as the much lauded tying of
welfare benefits to work requirements, that condition benefits on
behavior, a result that resonates strikingly and disturbingly in the long
history of using poverty policy as a means of subordination."'
C Re-Measuring Poverty
Over the last several years, a coalition of national progressive
organizations have supported and advocated a revision of the federal
poverty standard. This work builds on what is now a widespread
agreement among centrist and progressive institutions and experts that
the current mode of measuring poverty is ineffective. The movement to
change the measure has become a major focus of several important
progressive institutions and has resulted in currently pending federal
legislation that would mandate the creation of new metrics and a recent
announcement by the Obama administration that the U.S. Census
Bureau will begin issuing a supplemental poverty measure, along with
the official measure each year.16 In August 2008, New York City, on
157. Besa Luci, Cash Incentives For the Poor, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Aug. 2007,
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/socialservices/20070828/15/2271 (quoting
Margy Waller, a domestic policy advisor for the Clinton administration).
158. One disturbing piece of data from MDRC's preliminary report indicates
that those already experiencing more hardship are more likely to be deprived of
program payments. MDRC reports that, "relative disadvantage" correlated with low
program earnings in the first two years. TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY, supra note 126,
at 111. So for example, program participants with lower levels of education, lower
levels of employment and earnings and higher physical or mental health programs were
significantly less likely to earn rewards. Id. at 112.
159. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
160. Measuring American Poverty Act of 2009, H.R. 2909, 111th Cong. §§ 3-
4 (2009); Measuring American Poverty Act of 2009, S. 1625, 111th Cong. §§ 3-4
(2009); For information on the U.S. Census Bureau measure, see Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Census Bureau to Develop Supplemental Poverty Measure (Mar.
2, 2010), http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleasesFactSheets/PROD01_
008963; U.S. Census Bureau, Observations from the Interagency Technical Working
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the recommendation of the Commission on Economic Opportunity,
became the first local jurisdiction to engage in this effort."'
The justifications offered for changing the poverty measure sound
strongly in new governance theory. It is consistently described as a
precondition for evaluating the attempts to address poverty described in
Part I. For example, Rebecca Blank and Mark Greenberg-two primary
progressive proponents of the adoption of the federal legislation to
change the poverty measure-justify it in these terms. As states and
localities seek to develop poverty goals or strategies, they realize that to
measure the effects of their initiatives they need a measure of poverty
that takes into account the effects of policies such as health-care or
child-care expansions, and changes in the state tax structure.1 62
This effort was conceived in New York City of as a foundational
part of CEO's work.'63 And like New York City's evaluation of
Opportunity NYC, upon closer examination this seemingly objective
measure is informed by political choices that fail to bring to the
forefront some of the most pressing needs of poor families.
Before proceeding to some of the political choices that inform
these efforts, a bit of background on poverty measurement and some
description of the new measure and the prominent critiques of it
provide important context. There is significant consensus that the
current federal poverty measure no longer reflects economic realities
and fails to provide an accurate or useful measure. The federal measure
Group on Developing a Supplemental Poverty Measure (2010), http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/povmeas/SPMTWGObservations.pdf. The Census Bureau measure is,
like New York City's measure, based in large part on the National Academy of
Sciences methodology. Id. at 2.
161. See NYC CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY, THE CEO POVERTY MEASURE 2
(2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/final_poverty
report.pdf [hereinafter NYC CTR. FOR EcON. OPPORTUNITY, THE CEO POVERTY
MEASURE].
162. Rebecca M. Blank & Mark H. Greenberg, Improving the Measurement of
Poverty 6, 8 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/
2008/- /media/Files/rc/papers/2008/12_poverty measurementblank/12_poverty_meas
urement blank.pdf.
163. See Mark Levitan, Poor Measurement Series: Measuring Poverty in New
York City, Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.
spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id=606a3854-cd49-4778-82cd-
d8caecl94529 (explaining that New York City chose to re-measure poverty because,
"[tihe Commission members were soon confronted by the shortcomings of the
conceptual tools at their disposal. They found them inadequate guides for understanding
the current level of economic deprivation in New York, assessing the effect of existing
public policy, or forecasting the potential impact of new initiatives on the City's low-
income population. The Commission concluded that, along with programmatic




was developed in 1963, as part of the 1960s War on Poverty, by Mollie
Orshansky, an analyst at the Social Security Administration.'" The
methodology is fairly simple. It has two components: first, it defines a
poverty threshold. Individuals and families at or below the line are in
poverty and those above are not. Second, it defines the resources that
are to be counted when figuring out whether any particular household is
above or below the line. For the threshold, the federal measure took the
cost of a subsistence food budget for a family of four at the time and
multiplied it by three. The subsistence food budget was developed by
the Department of Agriculture in 1961. The number was multiplied by
three because in 1955, the average family spent one-third of its after-tax
income on food. 165 This threshold is adjusted annually for inflation and
family size.166 The measure is set nationally and is not adjusted for
geographic variation in costs. The definition of resources in the federal
measure is also very simple: resources are the pre-tax income of an
individual family. 6
Both the threshold definition and the resource definition have been
widely criticized for their inability to provide an appropriate current
measure. On the threshold side, it is simply no longer true that families
spend an average of one-third of their money on food. The current
estimate is that the average household spends about one-eighth of its
budget on food. 168 The enormous growth in housing costs is one very
significant-although by no means the only-change in family budgets
since 1963. Another consistent critique is the lack of any means to vary
the measure by location. There is no question that the cost of living and
poverty vary significantly by location: the same amount of money will
buy very different standards of living depending on whether one lives in
New York City, or a small rural community in the Midwest, or the
South. On the resource side, the use of pre-tax income is widely
considered inappropriate. Particularly criticized is the lack of
deductions for taxes paid or additions to resources to reflect receipt of
tax credits like the EITC or non-cash governments benefits such as
SNAP benefits and rent subsidies.'
In response to these longstanding critiques, in the early 1990s
Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to convene a
panel of experts and devise a new methodology for measuring
164. Blank & Greenberg, supra note 162, at 6.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 6.
169. Id. at 7.
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poverty.'o The NAS released a report in 1995 proposing a new
measure. The NAS measure, like the federal measure, consists of a
threshold and a resource definition but it varies in several important
respects. First, the threshold is defined by relying on expenditure data
for four basic expenses-food, shelter, clothing, and utilities-plus a
small addition for miscellaneous expenses."' The report suggests using
a number between the 30th and 35th percentile of nationally
representative expenditures using the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
This figure is then varied for household size and geographic location.17
On the resource side, the NAS report recommends calculating the
"adjusted disposable income" of each household."' Rather than
counting pre-tax income, the measure deducts taxes paid, adds in tax
credits and adds benefits that can be used to pay for food, shelter,
clothing, or utilities.'74 In addition, the measure deducts some expenses
for households that actually pay for them. Specifically, the NAS report
suggests deduction of child-support payments, out-of-pocket medical
costs and work-related expenses such as child-care and
transportation.7 5
CEO committed to re-measure poverty in the City to provide a
better metric with which to evaluate their poverty initiatives. The
report, issued in August 2008, was based largely on methodology
proposed by the NAS.' 76 As with the examination of Opportunity NYC
above, New York City's implementation of the NAS measure raises
significant questions about the political choices imbued in the
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id. at 16.
172. Id. at 10.
173. Id.
174. Id. Note that this very general description of the NAS measure leaves out
several details such as which taxes and benefits are included and precisely how the
formula works.
175. Id.
176. NYC CTR. FOR EcON. OPPORTUNITY, THE CEO POVERTY MEASURE, supra
note 161, at 2. The current pending federal legislation, introduced by Senator Dodd and
Representative McDermott, proposes that the federal government implement the NAS
measure as a principle tool to
provide for an improved and updated method for measuring the extent to
which families and individuals in the United States have sufficient income to
allow a minimal level of consumption spending that meets their basic
physical needs . . . in order to better assess the effects of certain policies
and programs in reducing the prevalence and depth of poverty, to accurately
gauge the level of economic deprivation, and to improve understanding of
the targeting of public resources . ...
Measuring American Poverty Act of 2008, H.R. 2909, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
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measurement tools of the new poverty agenda. Or to put it more
bluntly: measures that purport or appear to be objective (i.e., newer
and presumably more accurate measure of poverty or evaluations of the
"success" of Opportunity NYC) are informed by subordination-tinged
political compromises that are, in turn rendered invisible by the
seeming objectivity of the measure.
In order to understand this critique, it is important to look at some
of the effects of utilization of the NAS methodology. First, by tagging
the threshold to a number between the 30th and 35th percentile of
median expenditures, the measure results in fairly small changes in
overall percentages of people in poverty. For example, when New
York City implemented the measure, the percentage of people in
poverty went from 18 percent under the federal measure to 23 percent
under the CEO measure. While this is in some circles viewed as
significant, it perpetuates the exclusion from official "poverty" of
"individuals with incomes too high to be officially poor but too low to
make ends meet."'
The choice to link the threshold to between 30th and 35th
percentile of median expenditures is a purely political one. As
explained by many of its supporters, this choice is seen as reasonable
and key to the political viability of the measure. In evaluating the
impact of this political choice, it is important to look at the effect of
adopting this particular threshold in terms of who gets defined as
"poor"-and therefore is presumably worthy of support-and who does
not. Most centrally, leaving the overall number of poor people largely
177. John Quinterno, Poor Management: Time for a Comprehensive New
Poverty Measure, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY, June 8, 2009,
http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id=813ce98d-610f-
4f41-bl74-4c79e81c317d. Moreover, while rates rise in urban areas like New York
City, if implemented nationally they would remain stagnant or fall in rural,
Appalachian and Southern communities, leading to a fairly stagnant overall number of
poor people nationally. As Shawn Fremstad notes:
Changes in subgroup and sub-national poverty rates are not necessarily a
concern, particularly if the changes are due to improvements in the
accuracy of a poverty measure. However, changes that appear contrary to
other evidence about the distribution of basic-needs deprivation deserve
further scrutiny.
SHAWN FREMSTAD, MEASURING POVERTY AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION 19 (2008),
available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/2008-12-Measuring-Poverty-
and-Economic-Inclusion.pdf. Given the extensive evidence of material deprivation in
particular in the South and in Appalachia and the apparent economic instability of many
who will continue to be excluded from the "poor," these results are disturbing. Id. at
22. While these critiques are not really relevant to New York City's implementation, it
does suggest that national implementation of the measure will have negative
consequences in rural and southern areas.
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unchanged, and at the same time lending significant legitimacy to the
continued exclusion of large numbers of economically unstable
households from the definition, raises serious questions about the utility
of the measure.
Another set of results that appear incongruous to some analysts is
the effect of the NAS methodology on the comparative rates of poverty
among the elderly, children, and female-headed households. Under the
NAS measure, principally because of the deduction from resources for
out-of-pocket medical expenses, the rates of poverty among the elderly
rise more than for any other sub-group. In the New York City
measurement the rate of poverty among the elderly rose by 13.9
percent.178 In contrast, child poverty fell slightly (from 27.2 percent
under the federal measure to 26.6 percent under the CEO measure). As
Shawn Fremstad points out,
Considered in isolation, the increase in the elderly poverty
rate is unobjectionable and is arguably an important indicator
that more attention needs to be paid to poverty among the
elderly. However, when considered in relation to the decrease
in child poverty (or smaller increase, depending on the precise
NAS-style measure used), it raises a question about whether
the resulting rates are consistent with differences in other
forms of economic hardship between children and the elderly
. . . . In general, the elderly experience much lower rates of
economic hardship than children and families with children.'79
Apart from these more specific critiques, the NAS measure has
been criticized by some as too conservative for this political moment.
John Quinterno frames the growing support for the NAS measure as a
lost opportunity and as reflective of the late 1990s. As he frames it,
The NAS measure originally was developed at a time when
the economy was expanding, conservative politics were
ascendant and antipathy to poverty programs was mounting.
Today's environment, however, is radically different: the
178. NYC CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY, THE CEO POVERTY MEASURE, supra
note 161, at 3.
179. FREMSTAD, supra note 177, at 20. Another tremendously interesting
choice, reflected in the NAS measure, is the choice to count work related expenses like
child-care not as a basic need akin to shelter, food, clothing, and utilities. In the NAS
measure, a family's resources are decreased when they spend money on work related




economy is mired in a severe recession, the public is
extremely aware of issues related to work and income and the
political climate is more hospitable to progressive
solutions . . . . Might the time therefore be ripe to replace the
poverty statistic not with a reformed version of itself but with
a more comprehensive measure of economic well-being and
social development?"so
The NAS measure undoubtedly has a great deal to offer, but as
these critiques suggest, it is also a creature of political compromise.
Perhaps the most stark example of this is the choice to tag the threshold
to between the 30th and 35th percentile of median expenditures,
although the other critiques of the measure detailed above also have
political aspects. What is disturbing is not necessarily any one of these
substantive decisions; each can be justified in very rational terms.
Instead it is the impact of these political choices on the objectivity and
utility of the measure and, specifically for new governance, what the
complicity in political choices means for the viability of a governing
system centered on purportedly objective measurement tools. Quite
simply, if New York City's measure is perceived as an "accurate"
measure, what implications might this have for the ability of poor
communities to advocate for those-for example, significant members
of the working poor-whose poverty is defined out of the measure? Or
for poor children, whose poverty is minimized?
D. Are These Programs Accountable?
1. FIRST-MEASURE ACCOUNTABILITY
Opportunity NYC offers no suggestion that first-measure
accountability is present or important to those constructing these
initiatives. Although there are some informal mechanisms designed to
resolve disputes, the program has no mechanism for participants to
challenge determinations. It is true that the program is nearly entirely
funded by private sources and that, if the program were to move to
public funding, there may be significantly more attention to these
concerns. However, the lack of these mechanisms is nevertheless
instructive. As discussed in Part II above,' 8' privatization and softness
in law play a significant role in this lack of accountability and, even if it
were to become publicly funded, these characteristics may not
180. Quinterno, supra note 177.
181. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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disappear. Opportunity NYC is privatized to a very high degree. The
program is overseen by a part of the NYC Mayor's office, but it is
wholly administered by private, non-profit entities. Even in event of
public funding, these factors might dissuade any court from imposing
first-measure accountability mechanisms into the program. Opportunity
NYC is also characterized by a high degree of softness in law: there are
no governing, enforceable rules within the program. If a person fails to
get a reward that she claims she earned, she can informally approach
the nonprofit administering the program; but if this fails there is no
apparent remedy.182 More broadly than that, there are no legal rules
governing this program or any other CEO initiative. Neither
Opportunity NYC nor CEO are based in statute or regulation. The
office, and all of its work, is a creation of the Mayor and its programs
arguably can be administered in virtually whatever fashion the office
deems appropriate. It is possible that, if the program were to move to
public support, these concerns may be addressed. But given the likely
continued role of private entities in program administration and the
current absence of rules, this is not likely to happen without outside
pressure.
If New York City's efforts in general and Opportunity NYC in
particular are, as argued in Part II, emblematic of the new poverty
agenda, then it is fair to say that there is a trend-within the new
poverty agenda-away from first-measure accountability. If it were
likely that programs within the new poverty agenda would run without
error and without discrimination, then perhaps this would not be of
great concern. But the history and current reality of U.S. social-welfare
policy provides little to reassure us that these mechanisms are no longer
necessary. Across the country today, privatization of social-welfare
programs is leading to administration of programs that purport to help
people transition from welfare to work but in fact do a much better job
of punishing recipients than assisting them."' What little data exists
182. MDRC's preliminary data provide some interesting information about the
possible need for more or more formal dispute resolution mechanisms. For example,
"[diuring the in-depth interviews, almost all participants reported feeling that they were
not paid for an activity for which they thought they had earned a reward, even if the
case was later rectified or the participant recognized that he or she was in error."
TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY, supra note 126, at 84. On the other hand, the informal
mechanisms that are available, namely the staff of community-based organizations
administering the program and the centrally operated hotline available to participants,
were more likely than not to be viewed favorably by program participants. Id. at 85-
92. More data on the exact nature of the disputes, or the actual error rates would
provide assistance in understanding what dispute resolutions mechanisms would be
required and effective for this program.
183. Bach, supra note 9, at 295-96.
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strongly suggests that outcomes in welfare programs vary
disproportionately along the lines of race.'" Finally, across the country
today lawyers representing poor people continue to bring and prevail in
lawsuits that attack shocking failures of government to consistently and
fairly provide what they purport to provide."' In the face of this long
history and current practice, reincorporating first-measure
accountability structures into newer governing forms, particularly in the
field of social-welfare policy, is essential.
2. SECOND-MEASURE ACCOUNTABILITY
The case studies reveal that, within the context of the new poverty
agenda, programs that sound strongly in new governance in their
reliance on measurement, experimentation, and the creation of metrics
against which to measure progress, put forward a face of objectivity but
are complicit in the politics of subordination. What appear to be
progressive ends are not quite as progressive as they seem. In fact, both
Opportunity NYC and the new poverty measure implicitly accept
political consensuses that are, from an anti-subordination perspective,
highly suspect. In the case of Opportunity NYC, the experimental
design accepts behavioral control and deprivation of support for non-
compliance as the price of government support.'"' In the case of poverty
measurement, the measure's design accepts fairly arbitrary exclusions
of families earning above 35 percent of median expenditures for defined
expenses, and undercounts child poverty and families too poor to pay
for child care and health care, as the price of politics. In both cases,
these experiments will measure what those in the peer network that
defined the measurement tool are willing to look at and, conversely,
will not provide any data on questions that those who designed the
experiments are not willing to ask. So we will look at the effect of
conditioned benefits on the economic state of families in the near and
long-term but not at the price of the conditionality, no matter how dire.
Similarly in the case of poverty measurement, we will look at the
positive effect of some government benefit programs but will at the
184. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
186. Strikingly, prominent international researchers studying CCT programs
make no secret of the effect of political conditions on program design. In fact, Norbert
Schady and Ariel Fiszbein, authors of the seminal World Bank book summarizing the
current state of research on CCTs, identify the presence of a "political economy [that
is] antipoor" as a key factor that might lead program designers to create a conditional
as opposed to an unconditional cash transfer program. FIsZBEIN & SCHADY, supra note
128, at 12.
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very least fail to increase the visibility of the extensive material
hardships experienced by poor children and the wide swaths of
households who, though above the NAS measure, still cannot meet
their basic needs.
In this sense, CEO provides important examples of the way that
seemingly objective and rigorous evaluation structures, structures that
are fundamental to new governance theory, can be complicit with
subordination. To the extent that this is true, and to the extent that new
governance structures are, as detailed above, purportedly designed to
deepen democracy, these case studies raise serious questions about the
role of experimentalism in current poverty policy. The following Part
suggests some ways in which governance structures might be amended
to destabilize"' the political consensus reflected in these initiatives and
create opportunities for anti-subordination agendas to play a significant
role in poverty policies characterized by new governance.
V. INCORPORATION OF FIRST-MEASURE AND SECOND-MEASURE
ACCOUNTABILITY INTO NEw GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
The CEO case studies provide some answers to the questions of
accountability and governance posed at the beginning of this Article.
The social-welfare programs themselves, while offering some positive
assistance to poor people, are constrained by political consensuses
about which poor people deserve assistance and what they do and do
not deserve. Crucially for individuals interested in creating more
responsive policy, the governance structures provide few points of
access designed to ensure either that applicants and recipients actually
get the benefits they are supposed to get or that poor communities and
their advocates can participate in program design and evaluation. To
begin formulating a solution to these accountability problems one must
recall the way in which new governance systems purport to operate.
Speaking fairly reductively, new governance decision-making takes
places at three conceptual stages: (1) a broadly representative group of
stakeholders come together to set goals, e.g., the reduction of poverty
by X percent in a jurisdiction; (2) a governing body designs programs
and simultaneous systems to evaluate the efficacy of those programs in
187. The reference here to "destabilization" is a term of art and refers to
Simon and Sabel's conception of "destabilization rights" defined as, "claims to unsettle
and open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and
that are substantially insulated from the normal processes of political accountability."
Sabel & Simon, supra note 91, at 1020.
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meeting the pre-set goals; and (3) the programs are evaluated, and in
response to that evaluation the programs and responses are redesigned.
In terms of first-measure accountability, it involves only phase two
of the governing enterprise-the design and implementation of the
program. Here the solution is fairly clear. We must fold back in
individualized accountability structures. Section A below describes
what is required and argues that reincorporation of those structures
does not undermine central new governance objectives. As to the
second measure, at first blush the fact that there are no poor people
included in the governing structures of the case study programs,
appears to mean that they lend no data to help understand whether new
governance can work. However, when contextualized within the long
history of subordination in social-welfare policy, this absence suggests
that such inclusion may be difficult to achieve, leading to a need for
other more politically viable solutions. In short, in addition to the
important emphasis on creating viable insider participation mechanisms,
we must begin to create viable paths towards multi-level outsider
participation that can successfully intervene at all three stages of the
governing enterprise. Section B begins to sketch out this possibility.
A. Incorporation of First-Measure Accountability
First-measure accountability mechanisms must be included in new
poverty programs for two fundamental reasons. First, given the long
history of subordination and maladministration, giving up important
tools to prevent these practices would have to result in significant
benefits in order to be justified.'" Second, the lack of first-measure
accountability structures, particularly in highly privatized programs,
provides any easy mechanism for government agencies to implement
punitive, discriminatory policies with little or no challenge.'89
To reincorporate first-measure accountability mechanisms into new
poverty programs, program designers must ensure that, once a program
is designed and put into practice, it must be governed by enforceable
rules. This means having clear eligibility criteria and clear criteria for
how the agency, be it public or private, should interact with a benefit
applicant or recipient. So in the example of Opportunity NYC, there
would need to be clear, publicly available rules and a clear mechanism
for enforcing those rights. An administrative hearing system is one
mechanism that accomplishes this end, but there may be other
solutions. What is important is that there is some system in place that
188. See supra notes 18-21 and 85 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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accomplishes that goal. In addition, the possibility of systemic remedies
must exist. If the government designs and implements a poverty
program, there is no reason that an individual or class of individuals
should not have a clear right of action and entitlement to injunctive
relief to remedy any failure of the government to implement the
program according to its own rules.'" Moreover, to the extent that the
government agency uses private entities to administer programs, then
they, like their government counterparts, must be subject to remedial
judicial orders for failing to comply with program rules.
In a new governance context, any argument for reincorporation of
hard rules must answer a few key critiques. First, does the
reincorporation of rules undermine the innovation at the heart of new
governance structures? And second, does the reincorporation of
individual and systemic remedies raise significant problems concerning
the utility of those tools, the competence of the judiciary to formulate
effective orders, and the possibility that judicial orders result in
unintended negative consequences?
As to the first critique, in the particular area of government benefit
programs, if first-measure accountability is incorporated at the level
where a program is implemented it should not undermine innovation.
Calls within new governance scholarship for fewer and "softer" rules
typically arise with reference to the role of administering agencies in
regulating the conduct of entities and individuals. Regulations focusing
on environmental protection and workplace safety are paradigmatic.
Detailed rule-based regulatory regimes have been widely criticized. As
Bradley Karkkainen has described the critique, "[r]ules of this type, it
is said, are often both over- and under-inclusive. They tend to be costly
to implement, inflexible, insensitive to local variations in the costs and
benefits of environmental improvements, and they may stifle
innovation."l 91 Another and related part of the appeal of a less rule-
bound system is a rejection of principle-agent theory and dedication to
goal-setting and perpetual experimentation as a central governing
concept. New governance is said to have a "flagrant disrespect for the
190. Depending on the complexity of the system, the available remedy might
vary. So for example, in a program like Opportunity NYC, where there are clear
implicit eligibility rules, traditional injunctive orders might be appropriate. However, as
Sabel and Simon point out, public law litigation involving more complex systems is
more likely to succeed in destabilizing an entrenched failing institution if the remedy
focuses not on adherence to specific rules but instead on experimentalism within a
bounded set of goals. See generally Sabel & Simon, supra note 91.
191. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Regulation and
Environmental Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US
293, 293 (Grainne de Bfirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
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distinction between enactment (or law making) and enforcement (or law
application)."a The rejection of this distinction is based in the much
made observation that, "[riule makers know that today's solutions may
not be optimal by the time they have embodied them in specific
decrees." 93 These critiques, while perhaps applicable to an
environmental regime, simply do not fit in government benefits
programs of the kind run by CEO. CEO's objectives are to pilot
programs that address their goals. Opportunity NYC is one example of
such an experiment. While these concerns might justify devolution and
orchestration in light of learning, they do not justify running a program
in a fashion that undermines the ability of individual applicants and
recipients to enforce whatever rights to a benefit they might have under
the program. The central concern of the first measure of accountability
is giving an individual applicant or recipient, or classes of similarly
situated individuals, the right to be treated in accordance with clear
rules: to be given the benefit if she qualifies for it, to only lose it if
similarly situated individuals would lose it. Once the experiment is
undertaken, there is no reason, justified within new governance theory,
to bar rules that the program have clear eligibility criteria that
individuals and classes of individuals can enforce.
It is, however, probably true that importing the mechanisms of
individual and class-based enforceability may slow down the
experimentation process. It would likely subject private entities to
liability and judicial control and could dissuade some private entities
from participating in these programs. But ensuring that both public and
private entities administering government-supported programs
administer them fairly and consistently remains essential.
Finally, if properly structured, data arising from first-measure
accountability systems might lend significant information to those
evaluating the efficacy of the program being challenged.' 94 So for
example, if Opportunity NYC were subject to administrative hearings
192. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without
Sovereignty, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 395, 398 (Grdinne
de Bfirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
193. Id.
194. This idea is related to the observation of Noonan, Sabel, and Simon
regarding "the process by which individual case data is aggregated and generalized to
achieve indications of systemic problems" in governing innovations in the Alabama and
Utah child welfare systems. Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons From Child
Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 557 (2009). The idea is particularly
close to their call for incorporation of data gathering as a mechanism for learning into
administrative adjudicatory processes designed "to respond to stakeholder complaints."
Id. at 558.
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and the records of those hearings, stripped of confidential information,
were available to the public and to those charged with evaluating the
program, that could provide useful additional evidence to consider in
the ongoing evaluation of the program.
As to the second obvious critique, both Goldberg v. Kelly and
institutionally focused public law litigation have, of course, been
subject to substantial critique as means to ensuring accountability. In
particular, as Noonan, Sabel, and Simon note, it is
apparent that the hearing process was not adequate to
accomplish the broader rule-of-law goals of cases like
Goldberg. For one thing, beneficiaries lacked the knowledge
and resources to identify legally questionable decisions and
appeal them. Although rates of hearing decisions for
claimants were often high, only a tiny fraction of frontline
decisions are taken to hearing in most programs. There have
been many indications that large numbers of decisions that
could have been reversed at hearings went unchallenged.'95
While this is certainly true, this articulation describes the limitations of
the remedy, not its utter lack of utility. While fair hearings are no
doubt of limited utility, they do remain a vital individual, as opposed to
systemic, accountability mechanism.
Critiques of systemic judicial remedies, particularly in polycentric
systems, are equally strong. Again as Noonan, Sabel, and Simon note,
Lon L. Fuller (1978) raised doubts about the role of courts in
the welfare system by suggesting that "polycentric" claims
were ill suited for judicial intervention. Polycentric problems
arise in complexly integrated systems where a judicial
mandate with respect to one part might ramify in
unpredictable or uncontrollable ways to other parts.' 96
While these critiques are well founded, offer substantial arguments to
justify a move away from these strategies as the sole or even most
effective means to ensure accountability and offer important suggestions
for the form of relief that might be appropriate, particularly in complex
195. Id. at 557.
196. See id. at 559. See also Sabel & Simon, supra note 91, at 1017-18
(describing various critiques of traditional public law litigation including lack of
systemic expertise by courts necessary "to supervise institutional restructuring




systems, the case study above signals a virtually complete departure
from rule-based, judicially enforced accountability."' This Article
argues simply that, absent other mechanisms to ensure that individuals
can engage in the essentially defensive task of ensuring that government
assistance programs provide what they purport to provide, rule-bound
individual and systemic remedial structures remain essential.
B. Incorporation of Second-Measure Accountability
Measure two accountability asks whether or not those affected by
programmatic decisions have a real opportunity to participate in goal
setting and program design and evaluation. The answer provided by this
study of the new poverty agenda is a resounding "no." In this context,
there are virtually no mechanisms for substantive participation by poor
communities in program design and evaluation. The problems of
second-measure accountability are compounded by the incorporation of
some but not all of new governance theory. The new poverty programs
are experimental and characterized by public-private collaborations, but
they are not participatory, and this is, perhaps, the source of their
problem.
New governance theory suggests that programs will be continually
reevaluated and improved in light of evidence of their efficacy. The
status quo will, through the ongoing evaluation of policies and
programs by a peer network, be destabilized. That network serves as
the impetus for accountability for those implementing programs or
policies and the mechanism by which the governance enterprise pushes
toward better and better solutions to complicated problems. But when,
as in the case studies discussed above, the terms of the evidence, the
parameters of permissible questions, and the menu of possible
programmatic strategies are constrained by the biases and political
perspectives of those admitted into the collaborative body that designs
and evaluates the programs, there is a problem. The experimentalist
enterprise will move forward with no substantive mechanism in place
for people to ask whether or not they are meeting the needs of poor
communities as those communities might define their need or remedy.
Moreover, because of its facial reliance on empiricism, this harm to
poor communities is effaced.
So in the new poverty agenda, we are faced with a lack of second-
measure accountability. An obvious solution to this problem is that poor
people need a seat at the table, wherever that program design and
evaluation table might be located. And this is certainly a beginning.
197. See supra Part III.D.1.
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Inclusion in the governing body or peer network certainly contributes
significantly to second-measure accountability, and, as Lisa Alexander
suggests, in contexts characterized by disproportionate power and
subordination, it is likely necessary that inclusion be mandatory and
that their participation be supported by hard law remedies that will
enable them to ensure attention to their concerns.198 However, this is
easier said than accomplished. As argued earlier, creation of a robust,
participatory governing body where affected communities can have a
real say in decision-making depends on the relative political power of
the affected community.'" In American social-welfare policy, where
poor people have historically been stigmatized and targeted, anything
approaching parity of political bargaining power is unlikely to exist.
Moreover, the case studies above and the more general conversation of
the governing structures of the new poverty agenda suggest that there
are serious political forces at play that lead to the exclusion of poor
communities and their advocates from the governance table. For
example, despite fairly broad inclusion in New York City's Economic
Opportunity Commission, organizations headed by low-income groups
were not included. 2" Similarly, among the many initiatives described in
Part I, very few mandated inclusion of poor people on the governing
body201 and none included mechanisms, like those suggested by
Alexander, that serve to counter the possibility of cooption and
tokenism that can plague efforts to include substantive participation by
poor people in governing bodies.202
For these reasons, in addition to the essential work being done to
figure out how to render substantive the participation of these insiders
in new governance structures,203 in response to the perhaps inherent
limitations to insider participation in fields characterized by
subordination, the answer may be to broaden conceptions and modes of
participation and to focus energy on the development of robust
structures to facilitate multi-level outsider participation. What this
would mean, in very practical terms, is that poor individuals and
communities who are affected by policies but are not among the
decision-makers would have clear modes of intervention and advocacy.
198. Alexander, supra note 117, at 182.
199. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
200. For a full list of commission members, see NYC Center for Economic
Opportunity, Commission Members, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/html/about/
members.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
201. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 117.
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The question then becomes: at what point and by what means might
affected communities intervene from the outside?
The center of the second-measure accountability problem identified
in this Article is that, in the new poverty agenda, the terms of the
evidence and the parameters of permissible questions, and, as a result,
the menu of possible solutions, are constrained by the biases and
political perspectives of those admitted into the peer network that will
set goals and design and evaluate the programs. In the case of CEO, the
political biases of program designers, at every juncture from the initial
commission to the designers of the evaluation of Opportunity NYC led
to an experimentalist enterprise that leaves out possibilities that fall
outside dominant political notions of deservingness. Similarly, in the
case of poverty measurement, the measure that, according to its
proponents, will form the base upon which the City's and, if the
national legislation passes, the nation's poverty policy will be evaluated
in the future, effaces the existence of wide swatch of the economically
insecure and devalues the relative poverty of significant groups of poor
people. So if the problem has to do with the questions that those inside
the governing structure are willing to ask and the solutions they are
willing to consider, perhaps the answer lies in destabilizing that part of
the structure.
To further conceptualize these possibilities it is helpful to think
about two additional locations, outside the collaborative decision-
making body, from which affected communities might participate: the
first being an officially constituted separate monitoring structure that is,
in some sense halfway outside-constituted by the government but
outside the decision-making body. And second a location entirely
outside-locations from which those excluded both from the decision-
making body and the outside monitor might intervene to press for more
responsive decisions.
As to the location, "halfway outside," in an earlier article I
suggested that one might create community-controlled monitoring
bodies to provide measure two accountability for welfare contracting
processes. These structures can be conceptualized as ongoing,
community-controlled bodies that serve a watchdog function. In order
to function they would have robust access both to program data and
program administrators for the purpose of conducting research,
adequate resources in order to evaluate data that they receive and a
practical ability to issue reports evaluating the efforts of the governing
body.
317.
204. For an extensive discussion of this possibility, see Bach, supra note 9, at
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Moving the focus to a possible intervention from the outside,
poverty programs must be characterized, at all levels of governing, by
very robust forms of transparency. If an outside group is to challenge
the status quo represented by the politically constrained terms of the
evaluation mechanism in place, then that group must have access to
sufficient data to challenge those in charge. For example, on a micro
level, for Opportunity NYC, the program would have to make available
sufficient raw data and access to program staff and participants, and
outside groups must be granted the ability to force reasonable data
collection to enable outside research with independent conclusions
about the program's efficacy. Consideration should also be given to
expanding judicial enforceability of these data access mechanisms.
In addition, to facilitate outsider input, one might look to the
structure of traditional notice and comment for guidance and transport
that framework into goal setting, program design and evaluation
mechanisms. If a pre-condition to establishing a new initiative was to
publish the goals and proposed programs, some form of research design
agenda and then to subject the published information to comment and
response, as well as to publish research results and similarly subject
those results to comment and response, that might broaden the terms of
inquiry in a way that supports destabilization and participation by
outsiders. So for example, in the context of New York City's CEO, if
the initial report issued by the insider governing body, the Commission
on Economic Opportunity, and the proposed initiatives of CEO were
both subject to publication, comment and response, it might give those
who are, for reasons of politics, excluded from the governing body, a
structural opportunity to intervene at the point of goal setting and
program design to challenge the politics of the possible and to propose
that the governing body consider different goals, strategies and
measures for evaluation. Similarly, if the design of the poverty
measurement tool was subject to notice and comment, some of the
critiques raised above could have been raised, creating a strategic
opportunity to advocate for the use of a more inclusive measure.
CONCLUSION
U.S. social-welfare policy stands today at a crossroads. After
welfare reform, we find ourselves with on the one hand a shredded
safety net and on the other some significant, albeit politically
constrained, efforts to create a different set of supports. But those shifts
have largely come at the price of accountability. Today the new poverty
agenda is increasingly impervious to challenges that it fails to provide
what it purports to provide. More disturbingly, the promise of
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increased responsiveness and participation offered by new governance,
in this context, has failed to materialize thus giving poor communities
few tools to intervene to push the agenda towards a policy that might be
more responsive to their needs. If we are to reverse this trend and
strategically deploy the new governance promise of deepened
democracy, remedying these accountability failures must be at the top
of the poverty agenda.
